locate an office

offices near you

office near you

Investment Strategy

Is this time different in China?

Oct 1, 2024

Author: Asia Investment Strategy team

 

In the days leading up to the 75th anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic of China, policymakers announced a string of easing measures. The timing and magnitude of these policies caught many investors off guard, and both the Hong Kong and China onshore equity markets have rallied strongly over the past week to log some of their best performances since 2008. Many clients are now asking: Is this time different? Where do markets go from here? What are the implications for investors?

CHINESE EQUITIES DELIVERED SOME OF THEIR BEST RETURNS IN YEARS ON POLICY SUPPORT

Total cumulative returns year-to-date, %

Source: Bloomberg Finance L.P. Data as of September 30, 2024.
The line chart illustrates the year-to-date cumulative returns, expressed in percentage terms, for the Hang Seng and CSI 300 indexes from January 2024 to September 2024. Throughout this period, both indexes exhibited range-bound behavior until recent weeks. Notably, the Hang Seng index demonstrated a broader trading range compared to the CSI 300. The Hang Seng and CSI 300 initially declined by -12% and -6% in January 2024 but gradually rebounded, delivering returns of 15% and 8% by May 2024. However, the rebound was short lived as Hang Seng and CSI 300 declined since Jun 2024. As of 11 Sep 2024, total cumulative year to date returns for Hang Seng and CSI 300 were 0% and -7% respectively. From 11 Sep to 30 Sep 2024, Chinese equities delivered some of their best returns on policy support which beat expectations. Both Hang Seng and CSI 300 rose sharply, with total year-to-date cumulative returns of 24% and 17% as of 1 October 2024.
In this week’s Asia Strategy Focus, we discuss China’s latest policies, the macro and market outlook, and importantly, the opportunities and risks for investors.

The policy shift in China is a meaningful one. Policymakers are sending a clear signal to stop the de-leveraging spiral, which was a tail-risk many investors were worried about. Rate cuts in developed markets also provide a more favorable backdrop. In our view, the policy change warrants a substantial shift in the outlook, as it meaningfully reduces the downside risk to the economy and markets. That said, it is not yet translating into stronger growth. To overcome its various growth challenges, the economy likely still needs more policy direction and support in the coming months.

We are increasing our Chinese equity price outlooks and shifting the strategic view from negative to neutral. We see muted depreciation pressures for the currency as well. Government support for markets is explicit and we think present a near-term tactical opportunity. However, there are still question marks over policy details, and whether these measures are enough to spark a sustained reflationary impulse. Investor positioning is an important part of our recommendations – those with a large overweight can use this opportunity to trim allocations, while those with little or no China exposure can play the near-term tactical rally.

 

The newly announced policies encompassed monetary, fiscal and regulatory support aimed at supporting growth. What is interesting about this round of policy support is that they have been on multiple fronts, larger in magnitude, and generally unexpected by markets from a timing perspective. This represents a departure from stimulus efforts of the past two years, which were generally piecemeal and fizzled out over time. As a result, the announced measures handily beat low market expectations and sparked a rally in Chinese assets.

CHINA ANNOUNCED A SLEW OF POLICIES IN RESPONSE TO WEAK MACRO DATA AND PROPERTY PRESSURES

Announced policy measures

Source: Various government announcements, J.P. Morgan Private Bank. Data as of September 27, 2024.

Furthermore, an off-cycle Politburo meeting also focused on the economy and signaled for more expansionary policies to come – perhaps an even bigger surprise for markets.

These newly coordinated announcements of rate cuts, direct support for equities, and increased fiscal support indicate a greater sense of urgency to pull the economy out of deflation and restore confidence among consumers and private sector businesses.

A major difference this time is that the PBOC is focusing on ending the self-reinforcing deleveraging cycle that has dragged on the economy. The deleveraging cycle occurs when borrowers repay their loans and banks have to contract their balance sheets, which in turn pressures out other borrowers from normal business loans, dimming the economic outlook and further perpetuating the deleveraging cycle. Credit supply is available, but loan demand has been weak, a reflection of the pessimistic outlook held by households and businesses.

POLICYMAKERS ARE SENDING A SIGNAL TO END THE RECENT STRETCH OF DELEVERAGING

Credit growth, percentage point change, %

Source: People’s Bank of China, Wind. Data as of August 31, 2024.
The chart illustrates credit growth and the 12-month change in credit growth. Credit growth is depicted on the left axis and represented by a line, while the 12-month change in credit growth is shown on the right axis and represented by a bar chart. Credit growth declined from 16.2% in August 2013 to 9.1% in February 2017, then increased to 13.4% in February 2018. It declined to 10.3% in December 2018 then remained largely rangebound until February 2020, and rose to 13.7% in October 2020. Credit growth then fell from 13.6% in November 2020 to 8.1% as of August 2024. Credit growth, 12-month change started in negative territory from January 2014, reaching a trough of -27.1 in July 2015 and then rebounded back to positive territory in 2016. Credit growth, 12-month change rose from 1.85 in April 2016 to a peak of 46.8 in February 2018, then declined again back to a low of -20.5 in February 2019. It increased again from -20.5 in February 2019 to 29.5 in October 2020. Since then, it has been on a decline from 29.5 in October 2020 to -27.0 in October 2021. 12-month change of credit growth has largely remained in negative territory from April 2021 to July 2024.
Through this set of measures, policymakers are signaling that they are trying to stop the deleveraging cycle. The announced policies are geared towards stabilizing the financial channel in the economy, such as lowering borrowing costs, boosting liquidity to maintain asset values, stabilizing credit growth, and recapitalizing big banks – all aimed at boosting confidence to borrow and invest.

POLICYMAKERS ARE FOCUSED ON REDUCING THE DOWNSIDE RISK OF AN ENTRENCHED DEFLATIONARY TRAP

Source: National Bureau of Statistics, Wind. Data as of June 30, 2024.
The chart shows China’s real and nominal GDP growth, as represented by the left axis and GDP deflator (nominal GDP growth – real GDP growth). If the nominal GDP growth rate is higher than the real GDP growth rate, the GDP deflator will increase, indicating inflation. Conversely, if the nominal GDP growth rate is lower than the real GDP growth rate, the GDP deflator will decrease, indicating deflation. GDP deflator started at 3.7% in March 2022 but has steadily declined since then to -0.4% in December 2022 when real GDP growth surpassed nominal GDP growth. There was a slight rebound in March 2023 when we saw deflator rebounding back to a positive 0.7% as nominal GDP growth came in higher than real GDP growth. However, that was short lived as GDP reverted to negative levels and has remained largely flat around -0.7% to -1.1% since June 2023. During the period from June 2023 to June 2024, real GDP growth has been outpacing nominal GDP growth. As of Jun 2024, GDP deflator is -0.7% as real GDP growth of 4.7% is higher than nominal GDP growth of 4.0%.
It appears policymakers have shifted from avoiding moral hazard to focusing on an ever-worsening de-leveraging spiral. The shift is a clear recognition of the downside risks the economy is facing – deflation, weak investment, falling housing sales, and perhaps crucially, signs that the labor market is deteriorating. Many investors have been asking when the slowdown will end. Businesses have been under significant pressure from slowing growth and China’s challenging long-term economic transition. Youth unemployment was becoming a bigger issue and wage growth has turned negative.

CHINA’S YOUTH UNEMPLOYMENT HAS BEEN A PERSISTENT PROBLEM

Urban unemployment rate, age 16-24, %

Source: National Bureau of Statistics, Haver Analytics. Data as of August 31, 2024.
The chart shows China’s urban youth unemployment rate, age 16-24 from January 2024 to August 2024. China’s youth unemployment started at 14.6% in January 2024 and rose slightly to 15.3% in February 2024 and March 2024. It then fell from 15.3% in March 2024 to a low of 13.2% in June 2024. It then spiked from 13.2% in June 2024 to 18.8% in August 2024.

WAGE GROWTH, EVEN IN NEW ECONOMY SECTORS, HAVE BEEN UNDER PRESSURE

Source: Business Big Data Co Ltd, Bloomberg Finance L.P. Data as of August 31, 2024. 
The chart shows China’s average entry level salary for new economy sectors, a represented by the left axis and year-over-year growth on the right axis. China’s new economy average entry level salary has been on a steady rise from RMB 7409 in August 2015 to RMB 14191 in July 2023. However, it has been declining since July 2023, reaching RMB 13464 in July 2024. Similarly, year-over-year (YoY) wage growth in new economy sectors, have also been under pressure. Wage growth was largely range bound during the period of 2016 to 2022 but has been on a steady decline since March 2022. YoY wage growth started at 15.7% in August 2016 and has declined to -6.1% in August 2024, although there were some volatility in between.
With these policy interventions, policy easing can buy time for businesses to restructure their balance sheets, reorganize and adapt to those structural changes, while minimizing labor market disruptions and the downside risks to consumption and growth.

BUSINESSES ARE UNDER PRESSURE FROM CYCLICAL AND STRUCTURAL CHANGES

Industrial profits, year-over-year %

Source: National Bureau of Statistics, Wind. Data as of August 31, 2024.
The chart shows China’s year-over-year (YoY) industrial profits, in percentage terms from 2013 to 2024. YoY industrial profits started at 17.0% in February 2013 which fell to -10.4% in December 2014. It then increased to 25.9% in August 2017 but plunged to -24.0% in December 2017. YoY industrial profits stayed volatile from 2017 to 2019 and largely remained in the negative territory. YoY industrial profits saw a brief resurgence, reaching 13.7% in December 2019 but the trend reversed dramatically, plunging to a historic low of -42.0% in February 2020. Industrial profits experienced a drastic rise from 2020 to 2021, driven by a post-pandemic recovery and increased global demand. However, it fell again from 2021 to -26.5% in April 2023, then rose to 14.1% in April 2024. The trend has since reversed, with YoY industrial profits falling from 14.1% in April 2024 to -22.2% as of August 2024.

While the internal environment put more pressure on policymakers, the external environment also opened a window of opportunity. With the Fed cutting rates more aggressively than markets expected, the PBOC (and many other emerging markets) has more room to ease as well. This increases the likelihood for a more sustained period of global policy easing, lending more support for growth in China.

This is a meaningful positive shift, but we are not yet changing our GDP growth outlook. In particular, we will watch to see how these policies will fit together with the changing structure of the economy. There are three things to watch:

1. What are the details of the fiscal stimulus? So far the pronouncements of increased fiscal support are lacking concrete details in terms of size or implementation. To change the trajectory of economic growth, more fiscal support is likely needed. There are still a lot of growth challenges, and how the fiscal policies play out in terms of magnitude and direction remain to be seen.

MORE FISCAL SUPPORT IS NEEDED TO LIFT GROWTH; POLICY DETAILS CAN HELP DETERMINE THE ROOM FOR AN ECONOMIC RECOVERY IN 2025

Fiscal revenue and spending, 6-month moving average % change

Source: Ministry of Finance, Wind. Data as of August 31, 2024.
The chart shows 6-month moving average % change of fiscal revenue and spending from 1990 to 2024. China’s fiscal revenue and spending has been largely range-bound from 1990 to 2006, with 6-month moving average % change of fiscal revenue hovering between the range of 0 – 40% and fiscal spending between the range of 10 – 35%. Both fiscal revenue and spending took a plunge in 2008 due to the Global Financial Crisis. Fiscal revenue and spending 6-month moving average % change declined from 32% and 37% in June 2011 to 6.8% and 14.1% in June 2013 respectively. From June 2013 to July 2019, it remained range-bound but both fiscal revenue and spending fell again due to the Covid-19 pandemic, reaching -12% and -3.7% in August 2020. Fiscal revenue and spending % change were largely volatile from 2020 to 2024 but remained depressed compared to historical levels. Fiscal revenue % change fell from 8.8% in December 2023 to -2.63% in August 2024. Similarly, fiscal spending % change fell from 4.3% in December 2023 to 2.63% in August 2024.

2. China’s economic structure is changing. Compared with 2008 and 2015, debt levels are higher, overcapacity is worse, and rates are lower. Policymakers have been trying to change the growth drivers, away from housing markets, towards higher end manufacturing. This may limit the usefulness of traditional policy choices or levers.  

3. Low confidence.  Much of the post-Covid slowdown is marked by rapidly declining sentiment. Overall measured confidence among households and businesses are at historic lows. Apart from the housing downturn. Tighter regulations and a move away from a singular focus on growth to multiple competition priorities all contribute to lower confidence in the economy. It's unclear if this jolt will change that.


While the PBOC announced more support for local government and state entities to buy unsold housing, and clear verbal support for house prices, there is still uncertainty whether the sector can stabilize after multi-year downturn. Despite measures already rolled out to support the sector, home sales have continued falling. This suggests many buyers do not see housing as a good enough bargain. Sales volumes have collapsed, but prices have declined by less. Government support for de-stocking might bring some confidence to the market, but it’s unclear if the sector has found an equilibrium.

THE ECONOMY REMAINS UNBALANCED WITH OVERALL WEAK DEMAND, WHILE HOME SALES HAS COLLAPSED

Indexed level, Sep 2019 = 100

Source: National Bureau of Statistics, Haver Analytics. Data as of July 31, 2024.
The chart shows China’s home sales, retail sales, industrial production, and exports by value, indexed to 100 in September 2019, from 2015 to 2024. These metrics were growing steadily and in close alignment, indicating consistent and broad-based growth across all sectors from 2015 to 2019. This was followed by a dip in January 2020 due to the Covid-19 pandemic and a quick recovery in March 2020. From June 2020 onwards, a divergence is observed: exports significantly outperformed, retail sales and industrial production maintained a steady upward trend, while home sales declined sharply and eventually collapsed. Exports rose from 83.1 in April 2020 to 149.4 in July 2022 and remained largely range-bound, reaching 142.0 in July 2024. Industrial production rose from 95.2 in April 2020 to 126.9 in July 2024, growing at a steady pace similar to pre-pandemic trends. Retail sales observed a similar trend, increasing from 77.1 in April 2020 to 116.5 in July 2024. On the other hand, home sales have been on a sharp decline after rebounding from 2019 levels, falling from 113.8 in October 2020 to 51.0 in July 2024.

At a minimum, they greatly reduce the downside risk for markets and introduce an element of potential upside risk to our outlook. A key positive implication is that the PBOC is stepping up to minimize what many investors feared was the risk of a prolonged cycle of deleveraging. In addition, the equity market is a direct beneficiary of some of the announced policies.

Beyond this sharp rally, should investors consider building a larger strategic position, or is this just a tactical opportunity? For the former, we need to see companies generating stronger earnings going forward. We see onshore equities as a tactical opportunity right now, and we will wait-and-see before turning more positive on China from a strategic perspective.

This round of policy support leads us to upgrade our China equity view to neutral. We raise our offshore (MSCI China) end-2024/June-2025 outlook by 12% to 65-66/67-68, and onshore (CSI 300) end-2024/June-2025 outlook by 12% to 3,900-3,970/4,050-4,150. However, these figures imply little upside from current levels. The strong rally has likely front-loaded a lot of the positive news, and as a result the risk of market consolidation has increased, especially during the Golden Week holiday. A 10% or greater correction represents a trading opportunity with an implied “policy put” of the CSI 300 at around 3,100.

However, with a clear directive for potentially RMB800bn in credit facilities to be deployed into the onshore market, we see a near-term tactical opportunity and room to catch up to the offshore market (which has outperformed significantly this year). The scale of the stimulus is notable – equivalent to the amount of government-linked entities’ (or National Team’s) net ETF purchases year-to-date, according to a J.P. Morgan Investment Bank estimate. It is unclear if there are any direct liquidity benefits for offshore equities.

If substantial consumption-driven and property-related fiscal measures follow through in the next few weeks, this market rally may be able to extend and provide room for us to raise our index outlooks. Investor positioning in Chinese equities remains light, and if their confidence recovers further and they start to rebuild their positions, the buying interest could be significant, but this is not our base case. 

However, for most of the last 15+ years, rallies in China have been almost entirely driven by multiple expansion with little sustained earnings growth – and as such those rallies have proved temporary. If the economy improves and companies begin to sustainably generate more earnings per share, we would turn more strategically positive in the long-term, but investors would be wise to exercise patience.

CHINESE EQUITIES HAVE HISTORICALLY STRUGGLED TO KEEP PACE WITH THE ECONOMY

Indexed to Q2 2010 = 100

Source: National sources, Bloomberg Finance L.P., Haver Analytics. Data as of August 2024.
The line chart shows MSCI China earnings, index level and China GDP (indexed to Q2 2020 = 100) from 2006 to 2024. China GDP grew from 51.3 in March 2006 to 325.1 in June 2024. However, this has not been translated to MSCI China earnings and price level. MSCI China earnings rose slightly from 62.1 in April 2006 to 132.9 in August 2024. From 2010 to 2024, MSCI China earnings was largely flat. Similarly, MSCI China price levels rose from 61.9 in April 2006 to 171.1 in October 2007 and declined back to 58.9 in October 2008. It then remained range-bounded from 2009 to 2017, before increasing to 193.7 in January 2021. Since then, MSCI China index price level has been on a decline, falling to 94.8 in August 2024.

For the most part of this year we saw a bearish case for CNH, given 1) weak China sentiment and capital inflows, 2) wide negative carry, and 3) tariff risks and broader geopolitical concerns. The new policies have mitigated the risk of the first factor. In terms of carry, CNH rates may fall further if we see more meaningful monetary easing. The third pillar remains, and the U.S. election will likely be the next defining event for the geopolitical trajectory.

The factors above suggest the currency implications are more mixed instead of being outright bullish. Some bearish tail risks have been minimized, but a sizable policy easing suggests more supply of the currency. This is a bearish scenario unless the supply is outweighed by demand, so whether improved sentiment can lead to sustained capital inflows will likely be key to watch. 

THE TRADE-WEIGHTED RMB STILL ABOVE 2018-20 LEVELS; PERSISTENTLY NEGATIVE CARRY AND TRADE PRESENT RISKS TO THE CURRENCY

CFETS RMB Index

Source: Bloomberg Finance L.P. Data as of September 30, 2024.
The chart shows CFETs RMB Index which measures the value of Chinese yuan (RMB) relative to a basket of currencies. The index is managed by the China Foreign Exchange Trade System (CFETs), which is a subsidiary of the People’s Bank of China (PBoC). The purpose of the CFETs RMB is to provide a more comprehensive view of the yuan’s value against a broader range of currencies, rather than just the U.S. dollar. The CFETs RMB Index started at 95 in 2017 and increased to 97.85 in June 2018. From June 2018 to January 2020, which is the period of the U.S. China Trade War, the CFETs RMB Index declined from 97.85 to 93 in January 2020, it then increased steadily to a peak of 106.8 in March 2022. From March 2022 to July 2023, the CFETs RMB Index fell from 106.8 in March 2022 to 95.9 in July 2023. It then increased to 100.7 in April 2024 but has dipped to 98.36 as of September 2024, which is still above the 2018-20 levels. Persistent negative carry and U.S. China trade tensions could present risks to the currency in the near-term.

Another important factor is the PBOC's approach towards the FX market. We have started to see interventions to weaken the yuan and clear communications from officials expressing concerns over a one-way appreciation of the currency. This can put a floor on how low USD-CNH can go.

We lower our USD-CNH outlook to 7.10 (7.00 to 7.20) on a partial relief of negative tail risks. We are still cautious on CNH's longer-term outlook given extended negative carry and geopolitical uncertainties, especially against a basket of trading partners’ currencies.

These policy shifts are a meaningful change. The combination of monetary and fiscal policy easing reduces the downside risk, and depending on how fiscal support materializes, introduces some potential upside risk. We are increasing our Chinese equity price outlooks and shifting the strategic view from negative to neutral. We see muted depreciation pressures for the currency as well. Government support for markets is explicit and we think present a near-term tactical opportunity. However, there are still question marks over policy details and whether they are enough to spark a sustained reflationary impulse. Investor positioning is an important part of our recommendations – those with a large overweight can use this opportunity to trim allocations, while those with little or no China exposure can play the near-term tactical rally.

The policy initiatives indicate a substantial shift in how the government is approaching the economic situation in China. Will it succeed? Time will tell, but in the near-term the market is taking it positively and at a minimum it greatly reduces downside risk – both to China and the global economy.

All market and economic data as of October 1, 2024 and sourced from Bloomberg Finance L.P. and FactSet unless otherwise stated.

For illustrative purposes only. Estimates, forecasts and comparisons are as of the dates stated in the material.

There can be no assurance that any or all of these professionals will remain with the firm or that past performance or success of any such professional serves as an indicator of the portfolio’s success.

We believe the information contained in this material to be reliable but do not warrant its accuracy or completeness. Opinions, estimates, and investment strategies and views expressed in this document constitute our judgment based on current market conditions and are subject to change without notice.

This document may also have been made available in a different language, at the recipient’s request, and for convenience only. Notwithstanding the provision of a convenience copy, the recipient re-confirms that he/she/they are fully conversant and has full comprehension of the English language. In the event of any inconsistency between such English language original and the translation, including without limitation in relation to the construction, meaning or interpretation thereof, the English language original shall prevail.

This information is provided for informational purposes only. We believe the information contained in this video to be reliable; however we do not represent or warrant its accuracy, reliability or completeness, or accept any liability for any loss or damage arising out of the use of any information in this video. The views expressed herein are those of the speakers and may differ from those of other J.P. Morgan employees, and are subject to change without notice. Nothing in this video is intended to constitute a representation that any product or strategy is suitable for you. Nothing in this document shall be regarded as an offer, solicitation, recommendation or advice (whether financial, accounting, legal, tax or other) given by J.P. Morgan and/or its officers or employees to you. You should consult your independent professional advisors concerning accounting, legal or tax matters. Contact your J.P. Morgan team for additional information and guidance concerning your personal investment goals.

Indices are not investment products and may not be considered for investment.

We are not recommending the use of benchmarks as a tool for performance analysis purposes. The benchmarks used in this report are for your reference only.

For illustrative purposes only. This does not reflect the performance of any specific investment scenario and does not take into account various other factors which may impact actual performance.

Past performance is not a guarantee of future results. It is not possible to invest directly in an index.

The information presented is not intended to be making value judgments on the preferred outcome of any government decision or political election.

All companies referenced are shown for illustrative purposes only, and are not intended as a recommendation or endorsement by J.P. Morgan in this context.

International investments may not be suitable for all investors. International investing involves a greater degree of risk and increased volatility. Changes in currency exchange rates and differences in accounting and taxation policies outside the U.S. can raise or lower returns. Some overseas markets may not be as politically and economically stable as the United States and other nations. Investments in international markets can be more volatile.​

Holders of foreign securities can be subject to foreign exchange risk, exchange-rate risk and currency risk, as exchange rates fluctuate between an investment’s foreign currency and the investment holder’s domestic currency. Conversely, it is possible to benefit from favorable foreign exchange fluctuations.

RISK CONSIDERATIONS 

  • Past performance is not indicative of future results. You may not invest directly in an index. 
  • The prices and rates of return are indicative as they may vary over time based on market conditions. 
  • Additional risk considerations exist for all strategies. 
  • The information provided herein is not intended as a recommendation of or an offer or solicitation to purchase or sell any investment product or service. 
  • Opinions expressed herein may differ from the opinions expressed by other areas of J.P. Morgan. This material should not be regarded as investment research or a J.P. Morgan investment research report.

Index definitions:

CSI 300 Index: A capitalization-weighted stock market index designed to replicate the performance of the top 300 stocks traded on the Shanghai Stock Exchange and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange.

The MSCI China Index is a free-float weighted equity index. It was developed with a base value of 100 as of December 31, 1992. This index is priced in HKD. Please refer to M3CN Index for USD.

Hang Seng Index is a free float-adjusted market-capitalization-weighted stock-market index in Hong Kong. It is used to record and monitor daily changes of the largest companies of the Hong Kong stock market and is the main indicator of the overall market performance in Hong Kong.

The CFETS RMB Index mainly refers to CFETS (China Foreign Exchange Trade System) currency basket, including CNY versus FX currency pair listed on CFETS. The sample currency weight is calculated by international trade weight with adjustments of re-export trade factors.

Contact us to discuss how we can help you experience the full possibility of your wealth.

Please tell us about yourself, and our team will contact you. 

*Required Fields

Contact us to discuss how we can help you experience the full possibility of your wealth.

Please tell us about yourself, and our team will contact you. 

Enter your First Name

> or < are not allowed

Only 40 characters allowed

Enter your Last Name

> or < are not allowed

Only 40 characters allowed

Select your country of residence

Enter valid street address

> or < are not allowed

Only 150 characters allowed

Enter your city

> or < are not allowed

Only 35 characters allowed

Select your state

> or < are not allowed

Enter your ZIP code

Please Enter a valid Zip Code

> or < are not allowed

Only 10 characters allowed

Enter your postal code

Please Enter a valid Zip Code

> or < are not allowed

Only 10 characters allowed

Enter your phone number

Please enter a valid phone number

Tell Us More About You

0/1000

Only 1000 characters allowed

> or < are not allowed

Checkbox is not selected

Your Recent History

Important Information

Key Risks

In discussion of options and other strategies, results and risks are based solely on hypothetical examples cited; actual results and risks will vary depending on specific circumstances. Investors are urged to consider carefully whether option or option-related products in general, as well as the products or strategies discussed herein are suitable to their needs. In actual transactions, the client’s counterparty for OTC derivatives applications is JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. and its affiliates. For a copy of the “Characteristics and Risks of Standardized Options” booklet, please contact your J.P. Morgan Advisor.

May not address risks associated with investment in foreign currency denominated investments; 

This material is for information purposes only, and may inform you of certain products and services offered by private banking businesses, part of JPMorgan Chase & Co. (“JPM”). Products and services described, as well as associated fees, charges and interest rates, are subject to change in accordance with the applicable account agreements and may differ among geographic locations. Not all products and services are offered at all locations. If you are a person with a disability and need additional support accessing this material, please contact your J.P. Morgan team or email us at accessibility.support@jpmorgan.com for assistance. Please read all Important Information.

GENERAL RISKS & CONSIDERATIONS

Any views, strategies or products discussed in this material may not be appropriate for all individuals and are subject to risks. Investors may get back less than they invested, and past performance is not a reliable indicator of future results. Asset allocation/diversification does not guarantee a profit or protect against loss. Nothing in this material should be relied upon in isolation for the purpose of making an investment decision. You are urged to consider carefully whether the services, products, asset classes (e.g. equities, fixed income, alternative investments, commodities, etc.) or strategies discussed are suitable to your needs. You must also consider the objectives, risks, charges, and expenses associated with an investment service, product or strategy prior to making an investment decision. For this and more complete information, including discussion of your goals/situation, contact your J.P. Morgan team.

NON-RELIANCE

Certain information contained in this material is believed to be reliable; however, JPM does not represent or warrant its accuracy, reliability or completeness, or accept any liability for any loss or damage (whether direct or indirect) arising out of the use of all or any part of this material. No representation or warranty should be made with regard to any computations, graphs, tables, diagrams or commentary in this material, which are provided for illustration/ reference purposes only. The views, opinions, estimates and strategies expressed in this material constitute our judgment based on current market conditions and are subject to change without notice. JPM assumes no duty to update any information in this material in the event that such information changes. Views, opinions, estimates and strategies expressed herein may differ from those expressed by other areas of JPM, views expressed for other purposes or in other contexts, and this material should not be regarded as a research report. Any projected results and risks are based solely on hypothetical examples cited, and actual results and risks will vary depending on specific circumstances. Forward-looking statements should not be considered as guarantees or predictions of future events.

Nothing in this document shall be construed as giving rise to any duty of care owed to, or advisory relationship with, you or any third party. Nothing in this document shall be regarded as an offer, solicitation, recommendation or advice (whether financial, accounting, legal, tax or other) given by J.P. Morgan and/or its officers or employees, irrespective of whether or not such communication was given at your request. J.P. Morgan and its affiliates and employees do not provide tax, legal or accounting advice. You should consult your own tax, legal and accounting advisors before engaging in any financial transactions.

Structured product involves derivatives. Do not invest in it unless you fully understand and are willing to assume the risks associated with it.  The most common risks include, but are not limited to, risk of adverse or unanticipated market developments, issuer credit quality risk, risk of lack of uniform standard pricing, risk of adverse events involving any underlying reference obligations, risk of high volatility, risk of illiquidity/little to no secondary market, and conflicts of interest. Before investing in a structured product, investors should review the accompanying offering document, prospectus or prospectus supplement to understand the actual terms and key risks associated with the each individual structured product. Any payments on a structured product are subject to the credit risk of the issuer and/or guarantor. Investors may lose their entire investment, i.e., incur an unlimited loss. The risks listed above are not complete. For a more comprehensive list of the risks involved with this particular product, please speak to your J.P. Morgan representative. If you are in any doubt about the risks involved in the product, you may clarify with the intermediary or seek independent professional advice.

Conflicts of interest will arise whenever JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. or any of its affiliates (together, “J.P. Morgan”) have an actual or perceived economic or other incentive in its management of our clients’ portfolios to act in a way that benefits J.P. Morgan. Conflicts will result, for example (to the extent the following activities are permitted in your account): (1) when J.P. Morgan invests in an investment product, such as a mutual fund, structured product, separately managed account or hedge fund issued or managed by JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. or an affiliate, such as J.P. Morgan Investment Management Inc.; (2) when a J.P. Morgan entity obtains services, including trade execution and trade clearing, from an affiliate; (3) when J.P. Morgan receives payment as a result of purchasing an investment product for a client’s account; or (4) when J.P. Morgan receives payment for providing services (including shareholder servicing, recordkeeping or custody) with respect to investment products purchased for a client’s portfolio. Other conflicts will result because of relationships that J.P. Morgan has with other clients or when J.P. Morgan acts for its own account.

Investment strategies are selected from both J.P. Morgan and third-party asset managers and are subject to a review process by our manager research teams. From this pool of strategies, our portfolio construction teams select those strategies we believe fit our asset allocation goals and forward-looking views in order to meet the portfolio's investment objective.

As a general matter, we prefer J.P. Morgan managed strategies. We expect the proportion of J.P. Morgan managed strategies will be high (in fact, up to 100 percent) in strategies such as, for example, cash and high-quality fixed income, subject to applicable law and any account-specific considerations.

While our internally managed strategies generally align well with our forward-looking views, and we are familiar with the investment processes as well as the risk and compliance philosophy of the firm, it is important to note that J.P. Morgan receives more overall fees when internally managed strategies are included. We offer the option of choosing to exclude J.P. Morgan managed strategies (other than cash and liquidity products) in certain portfolios

The Six Circles Funds are U.S.-registered mutual funds managed by J.P. Morgan and sub-advised by third parties. Although considered internally managed strategies, JPMC does not retain a fee for fund management or other fund services.

In the United States, bank deposit accounts and related services, such as checking, savings and bank lending, are offered by JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. Member FDIC.

JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. and its affiliates (collectively “JPMCB”) offer investment products, which may include bank managed investment accounts and custody, as part of its trust and fiduciary services. Other investment products and services, such as brokerage and advisory accounts, are offered through J.P. Morgan Securities LLC (“JPMS”), a member of FINRA and SIPC. Insurance products are made available through Chase Insurance Agency, Inc. (CIA), a licensed insurance agency, doing business as Chase Insurance Agency Services, Inc. in Florida. JPMCB, JPMS and CIA are affiliated companies under the common control of JPM. Products not available in all states.

In Germany, this material is issued by J.P. Morgan SE, with its registered office at  Taunustor 1 (TaunusTurm), 60310 Frankfurt am Main, Germany, authorized by the Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht (BaFin) and jointly supervised by the BaFin, the German Central Bank (Deutsche Bundesbank) and the European Central Bank (ECB).   In Luxembourg, this material is issued by J.P. Morgan SE – Luxembourg Branch, with registered office at European Bank and Business Centre, 6 route de Treves, L-2633, Senningerberg, Luxembourg, authorized by the Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht (BaFin) and jointly supervised by the BaFin, the German Central Bank (Deutsche Bundesbank) and the European Central Bank (ECB); J.P. Morgan SE – Luxembourg Branch is also supervised by the Commission de Surveillance du    Secteur Financier (CSSF); registered under R.C.S Luxembourg B255938. In the United Kingdom, this material is issued by J.P. Morgan SE – London Branch, registered office     at 25 Bank Street, Canary Wharf, London E14 5JP, authorized by the Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht (BaFin) and jointly supervised by the BaFin, the German Central Bank (Deutsche Bundesbank) and the European Central Bank (ECB); J.P. Morgan SE – London Branch is also supervised by the Financial Conduct Authority and Prudential Regulation Authority. In Spain, this material is distributed by J.P. Morgan SE, Sucursal        en España, with registered office at Paseo de la Castellana, 31, 28046 Madrid, Spain, authorized by the Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht (BaFin) and jointly supervised by the BaFin, the German Central Bank (Deutsche Bundesbank) and the European Central Bank (ECB); J.P. Morgan SE, Sucursal en España is also supervised by the Spanish Securities Market Commission (CNMV); registered with Bank of Spain as a branch of J.P. Morgan SE under code 1567. In Italy, this material is distributed by J.P. Morgan SE – Milan Branch, with its registered office at Via Cordusio, n.3, Milan 20123,  Italy, authorized by the Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht (BaFin) and jointly supervised by the BaFin, the German Central Bank (Deutsche Bundesbank) and the European Central Bank (ECB); J.P. Morgan SE – Milan Branch is also supervised by Bank  of Italy and the Commissione Nazionale per le Società e la Borsa (CONSOB); registered with Bank of Italy as a branch of J.P. Morgan SE under code 8076; Milan Chamber of Commerce Registered Number: REA MI 2536325. In the Netherlands, this material is distributed by  J.P. Morgan SE – Amsterdam Branch, with registered office at World Trade Centre, Tower B, Strawinskylaan 1135, 1077 XX, Amsterdam, The Netherlands, authorized by the Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht (BaFin) and jointly supervised by the BaFin, the German Central Bank (Deutsche Bundesbank) and the European Central Bank (ECB); J.P. Morgan SE – Amsterdam Branch is also supervised by De Nederlandsche Bank (DNB) and the Autoriteit Financiële Markten (AFM) in the Netherlands. Registered with the Kamer van Koophandel as a branch of J.P. Morgan SE under registration number 72610220. In Denmark, this material is distributed by J.P. Morgan SE – Copenhagen Branch, filial af J.P. Morgan SE, Tyskland, with registered office at Kalvebod Brygge 39-41, 1560 København V, Denmark, authorized by the Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht (BaFin) and jointly supervised by the BaFin, the German Central Bank (Deutsche Bundesbank) and the European Central Bank (ECB); J.P. Morgan SE – Copenhagen Branch, filial af J.P. Morgan SE, Tyskland is also supervised by Finanstilsynet (Danish FSA) and is registered with Finanstilsynet as a branch of J.P. Morgan SE under code 29010. In Sweden, this material is distributed by J.P. Morgan SE – Stockholm Bankfilial, with registered office at Hamngatan 15, Stockholm, 11147, Sweden, authorized by the Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht (BaFin) and jointly supervised by the BaFin, the German Central Bank (Deutsche Bundesbank) and the European Central Bank (ECB); J.P. Morgan SE – Stockholm Bankfilial is also supervised by Finansinspektionen (Swedish FSA); registered with Finansinspektionen as a branch of J.P. Morgan SE. In Belgium, this material is distributed by J.P. Morgan SE – Brussels Branch with registered office at 35 Boulevard du Régent, 1000, Brussels, Belgium, authorized by the Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht (BaFin) and jointly supervised by the BaFin, the German Central Bank (Deutsche Bundesbank) and the European Central Bank (ECB);  J.P. Morgan SE Brussels Branch is also supervised by the National Bank of Belgium (NBB) and the Financial Services and Markets Authority (FSMA) in Belgium; registered with the NBB under registration number 0715.622.844. In Greece, this material is distributed by J.P. Morgan SE – Athens Branch, with its registered office at 3 Haritos Street, Athens, 10675, Greece, authorized by the Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht (BaFin) and jointly supervised by the BaFin, the German Central Bank (Deutsche Bundesbank) and the European Central Bank (ECB); J.P. Morgan SE – Athens Branch is also supervised by Bank of Greece; registered with Bank of Greece as a branch of J.P. Morgan SE under code 124; Athens Chamber of Commerce Registered Number 158683760001; VAT Number 99676577. In France, this material is distributed by J.P. Morgan SE – Paris Branch, with its registered office at 14, Place Vendome 75001 Paris, France, authorized by the Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht (BaFin) and jointly supervised by the BaFin, the German Central Bank (Deutsche Bundesbank) and the European Central Bank (ECB) under code 842 422 972; J.P. Morgan SE – Paris Branch is also supervised by the French banking authorities the Autorité de Contrôle Prudentiel et de Résolution (ACPR) and the Autorité des Marchés Financiers (AMF). In Switzerland, this material is distributed by J.P. Morgan (Suisse) SA, with registered address at rue du Rhône, 35, 1204, Geneva, Switzerland, which is authorised and supervised by the Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority (FINMA) as a bank and a securities dealer in Switzerland.

In Hong Kong, this material is distributed by JPMCB, Hong Kong branch. JPMCB, Hong Kong branch is regulated by the Hong Kong Monetary Authority and the Securities and Futures Commission of Hong Kong. In Hong Kong, we will cease to use your personal data for our marketing purposes without charge if you so request. In Singapore, this material is distributed by JPMCB, Singapore branch. JPMCB, Singapore branch is regulated by the Monetary Authority of Singapore. Dealing and advisory services and discretionary investment management services are provided to you by JPMCB, Hong Kong/Singapore branch (as notified to you). Banking and custody services are provided to you by JPMCB Singapore Branch. The contents of this document have not been reviewed by any regulatory authority in Hong Kong, Singapore or any other jurisdictions. You are advised to exercise caution in relation to this document. If you are in any doubt about any of the contents of this document, you should obtain independent professional advice. For materials which constitute product advertisement under the Securities and Futures Act and the Financial Advisers Act, this advertisement has not been reviewed by the Monetary Authority of Singapore. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., a national banking association chartered under the laws of the United States, and as a body corporate, its shareholder’s liability is limited.

With respect to countries in Latin America, the distribution of this material may be restricted in certain jurisdictions. We may offer and/or sell to you securities or other financial instruments which may not be registered under, and are not the subject of a public offering under, the securities or other financial regulatory laws of your home country. Such securities or instruments are offered and/or sold to you on a private basis only. Any communication by us to you regarding such securities or instruments, including without limitation the delivery of a prospectus, term sheet or other offering document, is not intended by us as an offer to sell or a solicitation of an offer to buy any securities or instruments in any jurisdiction in which such an offer or a solicitation is unlawful. Furthermore, such securities or instruments may be subject to certain regulatory and/or contractual restrictions on subsequent transfer by you, and you are solely responsible for ascertaining and complying with such restrictions. To the extent this content makes reference to a fund, the Fund may not be publicly offered in any Latin American country, without previous registration of such fund´s securities in compliance with the laws of the corresponding jurisdiction.

References to “J.P. Morgan” are to JPM, its subsidiaries and affiliates worldwide. “J.P. Morgan Private Bank” is the brand name for the private banking business conducted by JPM. This material is intended for your personal use and should not be circulated to or used by any other person, or duplicated for non-personal use, without our permission. If you have any questions or no longer wish to receive these communications, please contact your J.P. Morgan team.

JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (JPMCBNA) (ABN 43 074 112 011/AFS Licence No: 238367) is regulated by the Australian Securities and Investment Commission and the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority. Material provided by JPMCBNA in Australia is to “wholesale clients” only. For the purposes of this paragraph the term “wholesale client” has the meaning given in section 761G of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). Please inform us if you are not a Wholesale Client now or if you cease to be a Wholesale Client at any time in the future.

JPMS is a registered foreign company (overseas) (ARBN 109293610) incorporated in Delaware, U.S.A. Under Australian financial services licensing requirements, carrying on a financial services business in Australia requires a financial service provider, such as J.P. Morgan Securities LLC (JPMS), to hold an Australian Financial Services Licence (AFSL), unless an exemption applies. JPMS is exempt from the requirement to hold an AFSL under the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (Act) in respect of financial services it provides to you, and is regulated by the SEC, FINRA and CFTC under US laws, which differ from Australian laws. Material provided by JPMS in Australia is to “wholesale clients” only. The information provided in this material is not intended to be, and must not be, distributed or passed on, directly or indirectly, to any other class of persons in Australia. For the purposes of this paragraph the term “wholesale client” has the meaning given in section 761G of the Act. Please inform us immediately if you are not a Wholesale Client now or if you cease to be a Wholesale Client at any time in the future.

This material has not been prepared specifically for Australian investors. It:

  • may contain references to dollar amounts which are not Australian dollars;
  • may contain financial information which is not prepared in accordance with Australian law or practices;
  • may not address risks associated with investment in foreign currency denominated investments; and
  • does not address Australian tax issues.

© $$YEAR JPMorgan Chase & Co. All rights reserved.

LEARN MORE About Our Firm and Investment Professionals Through FINRA BrokerCheck

 

To learn more about J.P. Morgan’s investment business, including our accounts, products and services, as well as our relationship with you, please review our J.P. Morgan Securities LLC Form CRS and Guide to Investment Services and Brokerage Products

 

JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. and its affiliates (collectively "JPMCB") offer investment products, which may include bank-managed accounts and custody, as part of its trust and fiduciary services. Other investment products and services, such as brokerage and advisory accounts, are offered through J.P. Morgan Securities LLC ("JPMS"), a member of FINRA and SIPC. Insurance products are made available through Chase Insurance Agency, Inc. (CIA), a licensed insurance agency, doing business as Chase Insurance Agency Services, Inc. in Florida. JPMCB, JPMS and CIA are affiliated companies under the common control of JPMorgan Chase & Co. Products not available in all states.

 

Please read the Legal Disclaimer for key important J.P. Morgan Private Bank information in conjunction with these pages.

INVESTMENT AND INSURANCE PRODUCTS ARE: • NOT FDIC INSURED • NOT INSURED BY ANY FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AGENCY • NOT A DEPOSIT OR OTHER OBLIGATION OF, OR GUARANTEED BY, JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A. OR ANY OF ITS AFFILIATES • SUBJECT TO INVESTMENT RISKS, INCLUDING POSSIBLE LOSS OF THE PRINCIPAL AMOUNT INVESTED

Bank deposit products, such as checking, savings and bank lending and related services are offered by JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. Member FDIC.

Not a commitment to lend. All extensions of credit are subject to credit approval.

Equal Housing Lender Icon