The Implications of U.S. Intervention in Venezuela

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An embossed gold logo: J.P. Morgan.

Text: Ideas and insights. Clay Erwin, Global Head of Investment Sales and Trading.

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Good morning, everyone. [NON-ENGLISH SPEECH] My name is Clay Erwin, and I am joined by three of my partners this morning for this call, in which we will examine the implications of the recent US intervention in Venezuela.

But before we get started, I'd like to start with a personal observation. My career began here at J.P. Morgan 24 years ago. In 2005, I was sent on my first ever business trip, destination, Caracas, Venezuela. I was not prepared for the beauty that I discovered in that country. It was Paris in the jungle. Mountains as impressive as the Rockies of Colorado, but covered in palm trees. There were waterfalls, a warm culture, and rich cuisine.

And a short six years later, I took my last visit or last trip to that city, as it had become intolerably dangerous. For those of you who have been there before, you know what I'm talking about. And for those of you who haven't, I sincerely hope that the events which are unfolding today may increase the probability that someday you will have the opportunity to see the beautiful potential of the country of Venezuela.

Now, to assist me in this call, as I said at the onset, I am joined by three of my partners. Here at the end, Stephen Jury, our Global Commodity Strategist, here beside me, Nur Cristiani, our Head of Latin America Investment Strategy, and on the line joining from Washington, Derek Chollet, the head of JPMorgan Chase Center for Geopolitics.

What we would like to do over the course of the next 25 to 30 minutes is examine what has taken place in Venezuela, why it has taken place, and what the future might hold, to assign certain probabilities to the outcomes that are very, very hard to predict. And of course, along the way, we're going to discuss the economic and investment implications of those probabilities.

But it is very important that we keep in mind that having those conversations sometimes requires a suspension in the conversation of the humanitarian impact and what it might mean within the country of Venezuela, where our job as fiduciaries is to think about the geopolitical implications, the economic implications, and, of course, the portfolio implications of a lot of what has taken place. So with that, Derek, I'd love to bring you into the call. And before we start talking about what took place, I would love if you would take just a brief second to remind all of our listeners of what it is exactly that the J.P. Morgan Center for Geopolitics is doing today.

Sure.

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Derek Chollet. Head of J.P. Morgan Chase Center for Geopolitics.

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Thank you, Clay, and thanks, colleagues. And Happy New year, everyone. It's certainly been an eventful start. So my name is Derek Chollet. I run the JPMorgan Chase Center for Geopolitics, and we're a relatively new team here at J.P. Morgan to help clients, like all of you, better navigate as best possible what is unquestionably one of the most challenging and uncertain geopolitical landscapes any of us has faced in our lifetimes.

The news of the last several days is just a furtherance of what has been a remarkable period of time in world history where geopolitical uncertainty, the risks associated with that, but also, very importantly, the opportunities associated with these geopolitical changes, are something that we at JPMorgan Chase are committed to helping our clients better understand and, as best as possible, make the best decisions that you can.

So we are here to serve you. You can work with Clay and the team to contact us. You can find us on the web. If you were to Google JPMorgan Geopolitics, we will be the first Google hit you get. And please sign up for our materials. Sign up for our events, because we're here to really help you better understand what is a very, very complicated world.

So Clay, I also want to underscore at the top what you said, I think is very, very important. And I've been in and out of the United States government my entire career before joining JPMorgan. And I think it's always important, particularly in these moments of tremendous stress and uncertainty, to remember the everyday people, people like many of the folks on this call, who are affected by these events. Oftentimes, these events can just be boiled down into concepts or things that don't matter in everyday people's lives.

And I think it's important, given all the stress and uncertainty that's out there, to remember that. And we certainly do here at J.P. Morgan. And I think it's also important to underscore the tremendous potential and opportunity there is in Venezuela. It's a great country. It's a great population endowed with tremendous natural resources. And that's a reason why Venezuela has been such a focus for US foreign policy for so many years. And I think partly into the why, Clay, that's why it starts there.

I mean, clearly, for administrations going back the better part of two decades, Venezuela has been one of the key areas of focus in the Western hemisphere. It's, of course, been a very troubled relationship going back over those two decades. And what we saw happen just over the weekend was the most significant US military operation around the world in terms of special forces around the world since the raid that killed Osama bin Laden in 2011.

And it's, in my view, the most impactful US activity of any kind in the region-- political, economic, or military-- in 35 years at least, I would say, since the Panama invasion. So we have witnessed a significant event in the region. And I think we are only at the end of the beginning of this story. We are not at the beginning of the end.

Derek,

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Nur Cristiani, Head of Lat Am Investment Strategy.

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if I may ask you-- and I hear you when you're saying that this is something that has been present on top of mind for the US for two decades, but why now?

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Chollet.

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Sure. Well, look. I think first, you have to see this, as I said, as consistent with years of US policy in brewing confrontation with Venezuela and disputes with the Venezuelan government under Chavez and then Maduro over all matter of things, from the relationships that Venezuela has had with China and Russia and Iran and Cuba, to disputes over energy, to, obviously, drugs and narco trafficking, to irregular migration.

There's been a whole host of issues that, whether it's a Democratic president or a Republican president, there have been issues between the United States and Venezuela. So I think we have to see it as a continuation of that policy. Obviously, over the last several months, we've all watched a ratcheting up of pressure in terms of that confrontation.

And this is the sharpest, most stark example of that. And then secondly, I think we saw several things come together in the last few weeks. And we've seen the slow evolution of this, I would say, over the last several months, but it really came into focus over the last several weeks.

First, obviously, the policy towards Venezuela and the deployment of US military forces, the largest naval presence in the hemisphere that was deployed since the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962. And of course, we've all watched, going back to the summer, this escalating series of military actions against small boats in the Caribbean, in the Eastern Pacific, coming out of Venezuela all under the rubric of a counter-narcotics campaign.

Secondly, and more broadly, you've seen what has been a very stark pivot by the United States government going back, really, to a year ago when President Trump came into office for his second term, of greater attention and focus in the Western hemisphere by the United States. And I would argue, as someone who has some experience with this, the hemisphere has been under appreciated by the United States over the past several years and decades, and so more focus by the US.

Right before Christmas, the Trump administration released the national security strategy of the United States in which the importance of the Western hemisphere to the United States was front and center. So it's got us seen in the context of that. And in terms of the timing, what I would say is you had, again, several things come together. I mean, you had this escalating confrontation between the US and Venezuela.

You also had the fact that you had these military assets that were deployed that could not stay there forever. So in some ways-- and I had conversations with clients back when these forces were deployed six months ago-- that in some ways, once they were deployed, they were on a clock, because if they were going to depart the region without getting something for it.

And so there was a sense out there-- and certainly within Venezuela as well, but also the broadly in the region-- that a military action was brewing. I confess, I was surprised only in one respect. I was expecting some sort of US military action on the ground in Venezuela at some point right now. I was not expecting the Delta Force, the special operator raid, that we saw. But it was clear that the US was signaling-- and frankly, the Venezuelans and the region was expecting-- ratcheting up of military pressure.

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Cristiani.

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I was just going to say one quick thing. On top of everything that you've said, one thing that I would add to the conversation is under the basis of these renewed Monroe Doctrine, maybe with a little bit of a more transactional approach, oil, I think, is also a key component. And energy.

Yeah,

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Chollet.

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absolutely. And it's always been a key component. And I would say one of the-- perhaps the difference in the US approach towards this problem, if you contrast it with previous administrations and their approaches, is that the energy issue and the oil issue in particular is front and center. And I know Steve will get into more later about the reality behind that and what to really be expected.

And if I could, just one other thing just to level set on where we are. I think it's important for everyone-- and our colleagues and friends in Venezuela would understand this better than anyone. What has changed as a result of this military operation is only one thing, where the former president of Venezuela now resides. Other than that, the regime is still in place.

And the theory of the case by the US administration is that they're going to continue the policy that was in place a week ago, which is quarantine, some sort of embargo around Venezuela, sanctions, pressure on the regime, with perhaps some carrots, the idea that sanctions could be lifted down the road, or the embargo could be lifted.

But they're still negotiating with the regime. They have not recognized the government of Venezuela. The United States still does not have an embassy in Venezuela. We don't have any boots on the ground. There's no US troops in Venezuela. So to the extent that we're hearing about the US, quote, unquote, "running Venezuela," it's more of a sense of policy direction that the administration is pushing towards.

But they are still negotiating with the regime. So this is very different than Iraq or Afghanistan or other examples we have seen in recent history where there was genuine regime change. Right now, we've seen a leader change, but not regime change.

So

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Erwin.

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if we were to talk a little bit about what comes next and maybe start to talk a little bit about probabilities, let's just level set with some facts. The Venezuelans have experienced, over the course of the last 25 years, a massive exodus of their population. Almost a third of the population has left, over 8 million people.

They've experienced a decline in their gross domestic product of something in the order of 60% to 70%. They've experienced a decline in their oil production, which is a primary source of revenue for the country of around 60% to 70%. Massive rampant hyperinflation. Just to list a couple of things.

The people of Venezuela, many of the people of Venezuela, have tried, with democratic means and protests over the course of the last two decades, to implement change, to change their government, that has, up until now, been unsuccessful. We're at this unique moment in time right now where it does feel like there is an opportunity for change. How do you think about handicapping some of these probabilities of a utopian outcome or a status quo?

And then as we get into it, I'd love to hear a little bit about historical context. We've seen something similar in Panama in the '80s. We saw something similar in the '50s in the Dominican Republic. These are probably the good examples of regime change or government change. If you could include that in your description of these probabilistic outcomes, I'd appreciate it.

Sure.

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Chollet.

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Thanks. And great question, Clay. Look. I think, again, to go back to what I said before, what's very unique and makes this situation different than, say, for example, Panama in 1989 and 1990, is that this was just the removal of a leader and his spouse at this point. That's it. Nothing else has changed.

So we essentially have the same Venezuela policy, that the US approach is the same as it was a week ago. Now, the circumstances are different, and the theory of the case is this new leadership would be more pliable and more willing to negotiate the terms in a more favorable way to the United States. But that's the theory. That's the theory.

And the test will be, what happens when there's some difficulty there, when the leadership does not do what the administration wants it to do? Now, the president has threatened further military action. I can tell you, as someone who previously worked in the Pentagon, that is often easier said than done. The type of operation that we saw happen on Friday night, Saturday, a few days ago, was one that took months of planning, a tremendous amount of intelligence work. It's not something you can just do on a daily basis.

And obviously, an introduction of US ground forces into Venezuela, like what we had in Panama-- which it's important to note, in Panama, 35 years ago, there were 14,000 US troops already in Panama, because we had a major US military base there. The US still administered the Panama Canal zone. So it's kind of apples and oranges when you think of the two, the Venezuela case with these previous cases.

In terms of scenarios and what I'm looking out for-- with the huge caveat that there's a lot of uncertainty out there. But as I just try to step back and think about what could happen, to me, unfortunately, the least likely scenario right now-- and I'd put it at about a 5% chance-- is something that I would call catastrophic success where we get the democratic transition that many of the Venezuelan people have been clamoring for years and years and years.

You see accountability come in. You see the quick restoration of the rule of law. We see new elections. I think in the near term, that's unlikely. It could happen down the road, but I think this idea that it's going to happen quickly is about a 5% chance. And it's important to note, the administration, the president himself, has said it's going to take a while. This is going to be a couple years down the road that this is going to take. So that's number one.

Number two, and I would say this is the second-- this is more likely, and I put this at about a 30% chance-- is something that I would call a managed transition. And what I mean by that is perhaps a new regime of some kind that has remnants of the current regime as well as opposition figures, as sort of a technocratic unity government type scenario.

We've seen this elsewhere in other parts of the world where there have been transitions from authoritarian regimes to democracies. We saw it after the collapse of communism in the early 1990s. We've seen it throughout the Middle East in some places. So I think in that situation, the situation would be slightly better than it is now. We would hopefully see less repression inside Venezuela.

We'd see more access for US and other companies for Venezuelan energy. You'd see, from a US perspective, one of the things the US wants is more migrants sent back to Venezuela. And obviously, Russia and China perhaps reduced footprint of both those countries in Venezuela. So that I think is about a 30% chance.

The most likely outcome, which I think is a 50/50 chance-- so 50% chance-- is something that looks like drift. It's kind of a political limbo, so to speak, where it basically looks like it does today. Maybe slightly better, slightly less repressive. But more or less, you don't have big change at all in Venezuela.

And it might recede from the headlines. It's not something that we will be talking about on a daily basis the way we have in the last few days. It's not the raging fire it has been, but it's not appreciably better than it's been. I think that's a 50/50 chance. I'd say that unfortunately, because I obviously want it to be better, but that's where I think it's headed.

And then I say it's about a 15% chance-- I don't think it's likely, but we have to keep our eye on it-- that there's more of a systemic breakdown. I mean, we already are seeing an uptick in repression on the ground inside Venezuela. Obviously, as resources are further constrained, and as this unfolds, we could see greater insecurity, greater pressure, therefore, on the US to do more, greater refugee flows. And so that's something I think it's about a 15% chance, but we do have to keep our eye on it.

Interesting.

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Erwin.

(SPEECH)

I mean, I feel like we woke up on Saturday or Sunday with perhaps a moment of greater optimism, thinking that this was going to perpetuate a faster, more immediate transition to a democratic government and a return. It sounds like you're more conservative.

Yeah.

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Chollet.

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I mean, I've been up close and personal with a lot of these situations all around the world, and I can tell you that they tend to always-- the high point is when the military operation takes place, and it succeeds. And then pretty much, everything gets harder from there. And so even if you end up with a result that's modestly better than what was there before-- I mean, we've learned the hard way, the United States has, over now the better part of two decades in all corners of the world how hard this can be.

And it's even harder when you don't have a lot of tools. Again, when the US is trying to influence events with very little leverage-- I mean, there's not-- we have no one on the ground. There's no embassy. There's no diplomats there trying to talk to people. And so it's a very, very difficult situation. So I think to the extent we see change for the better, it's going to be very slow and evolutionary.

I

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Cristiani.

(SPEECH)

agree 100%. But as the Latin American in the room, let me bring back a little bit of that optimism. I do think-- hearing what you were saying, Derek-- that at least we have a 35% chance that things get better from here if we aggregate the first two scenarios that you just described. I think that is a significant change from what we had in the past. And just in itself, we should acknowledge the optionality that brings to the country and to the region.

If

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Erwin.

(SPEECH)

we were to transition a little bit to the markets discussion-- and maybe, Derek, you can help kick this off, but then Nur and Steve, I'd be curious to hear your perspectives. What does this mean for Latin America, perhaps more broadly? We've seen over the last 20 years a transition of many governments going to the left. Now, it feels like it's coming more towards the right.

You think about some of these individual countries and the benefits that they might get from some of this improvement. You think about Colombia, for example. It shares a border with Venezuela that's as large as the border between Texas and Mexico. This could be a benefit to them. Or perhaps it could be a challenge, depending on the relationship that they have with the administration.

And so maybe, Derek, we'll start with you, what this might mean for the rest of the region, the Donroe Doctrine, as you touched on at the onset, and whether or not there's more that we might see like this. And then a follow up question, Nur, is, how do you think about market impacts, investment opportunities, economic changes taking place in the region as a result? Derek, let's start with you.

Yeah,

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Chollet.

(SPEECH)

very quickly. I mean, look. The region-- it's been a sort of mixed response, as you know, in the region. I mean, a lot of countries have expressed concern with what's happened, but others have heralded it. And so I think a lot of uncertainty will persist, unfortunately. There'll be a question of, is this-- first of all, what's the direction of Venezuela itself?

And to the extent that Venezuela, we get that 35% upside, that's a good thing, no question, because Venezuela has, for a variety of reasons, been the single largest exporter of instability, whether it's through drugs or migration or flow of people, in the region. To the extent that that's better, that's good. But I think there's going to be a lot of concern about Venezuela itself.

And then obviously, we've seen it, a lot more concerns about what's next with the United States. And there has been talk of, well, how concerned should Colombia be? How concerned should Mexico be? How concerned should Cuba be? I will just say from my experience, I do not foresee anything like what we've seen in Venezuela in Colombia, in Mexico, in Cuba. Despite all the rhetoric and speculation, I think the circumstances are just are dramatically different, so I don't foresee that.

Obviously, the region-- as colleagues on this call know very well, the region is entering a critical year with two extremely important elections in Brazil and Colombia. And the situation in Colombia is interesting because, obviously, Petro, the current president, has sort of his own political incentives to ratchet up fighting with the United States and President Trump. And President Trump has his incentives to ratchet up the dispute. So I do expect we'll see more of back and forth.

And then with Mexico, obviously, we've got a very critical year with the USMCA review that is going to be unfolding over the course of the next six months. I mean, look. What I am confident in is that we're going to continue to see in a consistent, persistent US focus and attention at a high level on this that the hemisphere is really not seen since the 1980s. And so that, I think, will persist. The direction that takes is a little murkier.

But then I also think-- and I'll close here. I mean, the knock on effects of Venezuela, I think, are as important and interesting as what's happening inside Venezuela, whether it's the role of China and Russia in the region, and the region is seen as an arena for the competition between the US and China, or the knock on effects more broadly outside the region in Europe. And obviously, we've talked a lot in the last two days about Greenland in ways that probably very few people expected we would be talking about at the end of last year. So that's something I think we need to be watching as we head in through the year here.

And

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Cristiani.

(SPEECH)

from a market perspective, it's hard to think about immediate implementation or impacts for portfolios from a Latin American angle. But what I can say, though, is that for the last two years, we at the Private Bank, we have been highlighting the growing importance that Latin America should have, maybe if not so much for portfolios, but at least in the focus of investors. And this year in particular in our Private Bank outlook for 2026, we have a whole section around fragmentation. Who are the winners? Who are the losers? From these whole theme.

Fragmentation.

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Erwin.

(SPEECH)

Just help me out. What does that mean to you when you say that?

As

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Cristiani.

(SPEECH)

we move towards-- and it's not something that is necessarily new, but as we move more towards a world that is polarized with two main axes, there's a certain cohort in between, who are the winners and the losers? As we see divergence between US economic and market in investment policy, and on the opposite side, we see China also in this AI race to success.

One of the regions, if not the region, that we see as the biggest beneficiary of all of this is Latin America. And something that we have been very emphatic on our research is that Latin America has what the world wants. What does the world want? And that was what I was telling Derek in the beginning. Energy. That's a big wall of worry as we continue to evolve through the AI revolution.

Latin America has good demographics. Latin America has a good geographical position with connectivity both to China and to the US. And hence, I couldn't agree more with you, Derek, in terms of the region growing in importance, especially as we look back to the Western hemisphere from the US administration.

I

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Erwin.

(SPEECH)

mean, it's remarkable what you say. The natural resources, the industrious population, the congruency of cultures between North and South America, it feels like that truly is a fantastic combination. And like Derek was saying, this potential partnership or closer alignment that we haven't seen since the 1980s is potentially a long term positive for this hemisphere.

And

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Cristiani.

(SPEECH)

don't get me wrong. I mean, for the last two years, Latin American markets have been incredibly successful, have been performing really, really well. If we look at Chile, for example, last year, 2025, performance was over 40%. Currencies have been appreciating. Maybe it was due to dollar weakness. But just putting it aside, performance has somewhat recognized it-- in a very small scale considering how much Latin America weighs in global indices-- but nonetheless, it's something that we need to keep an eye out for.

I

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Erwin.

(SPEECH)

want to come back and explore broader Latin America in just a moment. Maybe before we do, staying within Venezuela for a moment, Steve, I would love to bring you into the conversation. One of the more remarkable statistics that we've all talked about over the last several days-- maybe many know, maybe many don't-- but that the largest proven reserves of hydrocarbons in the world can be found within Venezuela itself.

This is part of the reason you were talking about oil and the implications that it might have had in this weekend's activities. But Steve, help us understand for a moment. What type of capital is required to access these reserves? What is the timeline that is realistic in order to be able to do it? How could this immediately impact the oil markets or not? I just would be curious to hear maybe that probabilistic outcome, not unlike what Derek offered on the geopolitical side, but with the natural resource conversation.

If

(DESCRIPTION)

Cristiani.

(SPEECH)

I may add to a question, Steve, for you as well. If we could just also get your thoughts on the announcement yesterday night by President Trump of 30 to 50 million barrels of oil being sent from Venezuela to the US. How feasible is that?

OK.

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Stephen Jury, Vice Chairman, Global Commodity Strategist.

(SPEECH)

So you're right, Clay, there is an enormous amount of oil and gas in Venezuela, along with metals, some of which are strategic metals, which is another important part of this discussion. The numbers batted around are 300 billion barrels. I mean, that is massive. But there is a difference between accounting and geology. And what is really recoverable is something different from what is said to be in the ground by the accountants.

Now, in terms of expenditure, like you, I was in Caracas over a decade ago, stunned by the beauty, stressed by the political situation. But our conclusion at the end of that visit was that it was probably going to take three or four years for Venezuela to get back to two and a half to three million barrels of production. They're down to about 800,000 barrels a day now. You see some numbers saying 700,000, some saying 900,000. It's always difficult to know what sovereign production is.

It's going to cost tens of billions of dollars to bring that infrastructure back up to the level where the Venezuelans can start to produce oil that they were producing prior to the seizure of American assets that took place in 2007 under the Chavez regime, which is part of the reason why we've seen this intervention in Venezuela, because Trump claims that the Venezuelans have stolen our oil. I don't know that it's our oil, but certainly, there were oil assets that were seized and rolled into PDVSA.

And now, we have a lot of outstanding claims as a result of that, that not just the United States, but holders of failed or defaulted PDVSA bonds are looking to reclaim. And part of the process of repaying those claims is going to be generating more and more oil production. Oil exports from Venezuela dropped 36% as a result of the naval blockade in December alone, and now, the United States is looking to start to increase those exports again.

And I think that's part of the discussion that we saw from Trump last night saying that the Venezuelans will supply 30 to 50 million barrels of oil to the United States, which they will then export to countries of their choice. Remember, they've been trying to prevent that all go cheaply to China. Now, what is interesting about Venezuelan oil is that it's very, very heavy. And when the refineries in the United States [INAUDIBLE]--

Heavy

(DESCRIPTION)

Erwin.

(SPEECH)

means a higher sulfur content or--

(DESCRIPTION)

Jury.

(SPEECH)

Yes. So we haven't built a refinery in the United States in over 35 years. And so when those refineries were built in the US, they were built to process Venezuelan oil. And so the advent of shale and the light oil that we now produce in the US is great, but the refineries can't refine it. They need to blend it with heavy oil.

And heavy oil from Venezuela trades at a significant discount to Brent, $10 to $20 below the price. Now, that's very attractive to US refiners. So getting access to that oil is something that they are very, very keen on. But it's going to take time. We think, short term, you might see 250,000 new barrels of Venezuelan oil come to market over the next year.

In

(DESCRIPTION)

Erwin.

(SPEECH)

context, 250,000 versus global supply [INAUDIBLE].

(DESCRIPTION)

Jury.

(SPEECH)

It's nothing. I mean, global demand runs at around about 102 million barrels a day right now, so it's a very, very small amount. But it will help revenues in Venezuela. And so the idea that we can start to improve the economy, and gradually get back to a level of GDP that is significantly higher than where we are today, is obviously something that is pretty compelling for Venezuela and the people that are still living there. This, along with development of gas resources and the existing metal resources, could be a potential path to a much better country in the future and something--

Who loses,

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Cristiani.

(SPEECH)

Steve? Sorry for interrupting. But who loses?

Well,

(DESCRIPTION)

Jury.

(SPEECH)

in the short term, the losers are Cuba and China. And then Russia, because they have assets within the country themselves and outstanding loans, they will join the list of very complex liabilities now that will be seeking recourse in the years ahead. We don't how that's going to play out. And again, this is more of just a black hole that we're going into. The situation will evolve, but it's going to take time.

So the reaction of markets so far has been twofold. Oil prices have come down a little bit. The big beneficiary has been gold. And I think that if you look at the world now, and the geopolitical sense of where the United States is, certainly some actors in the world are going to say that this is reckless, and so they may reconsider their allocation of dollar reserves.

There aren't really a lot of choices other than owning the US dollar, but you can own gold. And so I think that for people that don't have a foreign policy or countries that don't have a foreign policy aligned with the United States, gold becomes much more attractive. And so we think that there's a lot of room for appreciation over the next 12 months, and clients should think about adding more gold to their portfolios.

Steve,

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Erwin.

(SPEECH)

that's a position you've held, really, since before the start of last year, and it sounds like this is only adding more confidence to that position that gold is likely to be up a good part of a portfolio in 2026. With an eye on the clock, we had committed to ending the call right near the bottom of the hour, and we are coming up on that time, so I want to make sure that we have time for closing comments from either of you.

Steve, if I could summarize and make sure that I'm accurately reflecting your position, that your level of optimism with respect to the oil markets or investment opportunities for US Petro majors that might come from Venezuela, feel to be congruent or aligned with what Derek is saying, that a lot of this is going to depend on the success of whatever change within the Venezuelan government we might see.

As a result, it will require tens of billions of dollars of investment, which is very likely investments that won't be made until there is greater clarity on the geopolitical side. And perhaps that investment opportunity, as a result, is more focused on gold and precious metals, perhaps, than it is in the energy space. Is that a fair characterization?

In

(DESCRIPTION)

Jury.

(SPEECH)

the shorter term. I think some of the refiners in the United States that are consumers of that Venezuelan oil will definitely be beneficiaries as well.

And

(DESCRIPTION)

Erwin.

(SPEECH)

then Nur, I know that your team does a lot of work on Latin America investment opportunities within Latin America itself. I trust that we can count on you over the course of this year to make those adaptations to our outlook and communicate it to everybody on the call as those developments continue to take place.

Absolutely.

(DESCRIPTION)

Cristiani.

(SPEECH)

And I think that the most important part that we need to emphasize here is optionality. The key word is optionality, because that's what's going to define the narrative around Latin America for 2026.

(DESCRIPTION)

Erwin.

(SPEECH)

Derek, we really appreciate you joining the call today. We know that you're incredibly busy. It seems like almost every day, there is something new that we are relying on you and your team and your expertise for. We appreciate you sharing time with us this afternoon. To everybody who shared part of your morning with us to take part in this important conversation, we appreciate the confidence that you've shown us. It is our commitment to continue to host these calls as new information becomes available. And in the meantime, with any further questions, please reach out to your J.P. Morgan representative. We're here to answer any questions that you might have.

(DESCRIPTION)

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