Alternatives Access: The Case for Private Investing in Asia

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This session is closed to the press. Welcome to the JP Morgan webcast. This is intended for informational purposes only. Opinions expressed herein are those of the speakers and may differ from those of other JP Morgan employees and affiliates. Historical information and outlooks are not guarantees of future results. Any views and strategies described may not be appropriate for all participants and should not be intended as personal investment, financial, or other advice. As a reminder, investment products are not FDIC insured, do not have bank guarantee, and they may lose value. The webcast may now begin.

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Gold ink swishes across a black background, forming lines and curves of letters.

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In cursive appears text: J.P. Morgan. A long swash from the n goes beneath Morgan.

Jasmine Green-Hogan, Alternative Investments Specialist, J.P. Morgan Private Bank. Jasmine sits at a table in an office with city views out of the windows behind her.

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Hello, everyone, and thanks for joining us. Wherever you are in the world and whatever time it may be, thanks for hopping on. It's going to be a good one. My name is Jasmine Green-Hogan and this is Alternatives Access, where really our goal is to bring you five new ideas in 25 minutes, really opening up alternatives to you. Hopefully, it's a conversation that will be interesting. Hopefully, something will resonate.

And today, I've got a guest that I'm thrilled that we have. John Salata, who's chair of EQT Group, who spent decades-plus in the private equity space is going to take us through, really the case for Asia today. There's so much taking place around the world in private markets specifically, the thesis that we're all sort of here today, but some really interesting nuances in parts of the market. So I'm going to bring John Salata into the conversation for us to just dive in. John, thank you so much for being here.

It's great to be here with you, Jasmine, today. Thank you.

I think it's going to be a lot of fun. We are not going to waste any time because we only have 24 more minutes to give everybody the juice. But I think in the spirit of that, idea one. Before we jump into market-specific dynamics, would you just remind everyone what is private equity, and why would someone put their next incremental dollar in private markets versus public, maybe?

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Jean Salata, Chair, EQT Group.

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Well, I think private markets traditionally has been a more of a niche corner of the asset allocation strategy, certainly for individual investors and even for institutions. But what we've seen over the last 10, 20 years, more of a shift to allocations to private markets because more companies are staying private longer now. So in order to get exposure to broader segments of the economy, people are thinking they need to be invested in private markets, as well as public markets, in a sort of complementary way.

If you look at some of the biggest companies in the world, I think the data is something like 90% of companies with more than $100 million of revenue are still privately held. And the public markets represent some great companies. But increasingly, those companies, it's becoming more and more concentrated around a smaller and smaller group of very successful technology companies, mainly in the public markets. And so to broaden and to diversify exposure, we see more and more clients looking to private markets. And also, something we'll talk about today probably is looking to broaden their exposure even geographically outside the US.

And it's a great point around companies staying private longer, more concentration in public equity markets. Those are things that we see every day in the headlines. I think what often doesn't get talked about is where in the first steps of diversification, where you go next. And to your point, I think increasingly so, private markets have become more accessible, whether it's through evergreen structures, through there just being a institutionalized asset class. Now, private equity going on five decades, if you will, of really being an asset class.

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A slide appears. Text: U.S. stock market valuation multiples are currently in the 98th percentile of the last 100 years, and Asia has outperformed. Two graphs appear. The first is titled Cyclically adjusted P.E. multiple (S&P 500), with footnote 1. The chart shows cyclically adjusted P.E. multiple across decades, from 1900 to 2020, from 5x on the cheaper end to 50x on the more expensive end. The line is jagged, showing an increase from 1900 to 1920, followed by a dip all the way to 1930, a sharp rise going into 1940, followed by a series of dips and rises, with the highest rise in 2000, followed by another dip, then a rise going all the way to 2020. The end of the line is circled and labeled with text: May 2026: 39.6 x. The second graph is titled Asia outperforming the U.S. since the start of 2025, with footnotes 2 and 3. The x-axis spans from January 2025 to May 2026 and the y-axis spans from 80 to 340, at the top of which is text: Rebased to 100. In April 2025 is a vertical dashed line labeled U.S. Tariff Announcement. In February 2026 is a vertical dashed line labeled Software Sell-Off. The country with the highest percentage and sharpest rise is Korea at plus 212%. The next highest is Japan with plus 56%, followed by MSCI Asia with plus 47%, Europe with plus 34%, Hong Kong with plus 32%, and U.S. with plus 26%. Footnote 1, text: Source: Shiller Data, Yale University Department of Economics. As of May 5, 2026. Footnote 2, text: Source: Bloomberg, as of May 15, 2026. Footnote 3, text: S&P 500 used to represent the U.S. market performance. MSCI Asia used to represent Asia market performance. Nikkei 225 used to represent Japan market performance. Hang Seng Index used to represent Hong Kong market performance. KOSPI Index used to represent Korea market performance. MSCI Europe used to represent Europe market performance.

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That said, this chart is super helpful. And I think one of the things that we've talked about recently is this idea that US public equity markets may be expensive. And really, on the private side you could probably argue the same thing. Take me through your view from the EQT lens of US versus Asia, and really rest of world and how you think about them side by side.

Yeah. Well, at EQT, about 65% of our investments are outside the United States. So from our vantage point we see a lot of the markets through the lens of Europe and Asia as well as the US. But I think we have a good perspective on what's happening outside the US.

And what we're seeing from our clients is depicted in this chart here, which is that US market's have been on a tear. It's done very well. If you've been investing in the US market, you've done well. But we're starting to see actually for the first time last year outperformance by markets outside the US.

On the public markets, you can see here, Korea was the number one performing market in the world last year, followed by Japan. And the MSCI Asia was up nearly 50% last year compared to good, decent performance in the United States, which has been continuing.

But the idea of being more diversified, of being less concentrated around that core group of the Mag Seven names that people are exposed to, not to say that people don't want exposure to that because I think people want to continue to be exposed to them because there's good fundamental growth there. But where does the next incremental dollar get allocated, or how do you think about your overall portfolio allocation and diversification? That's where we're seeing an increasing level of interest in international markets in global private equity allocations.

Well, and I think, historically, there's always been a hesitancy, if you will, to rest of world because there's been historically more volatility. When you think about the risk in rest of world, or Asia specifically, how do you assess how you underwrite? Does the return threshold need to look higher? Does the company need to have more earnings? How are you thinking about on a relative basis, the risk that someone would think about?

Yeah, I think one of the things that's happened in the private markets, private equity industry in Asia over the last, say, really 15 years, 10, 15 years, has been the advent of a true buyout market in Asia, which means that we have the same tool-- we can bring the same toolkit now to the asset class that you have in the US and in Europe, meaning that before, to invest in emerging markets, you're typically taking minority stakes, earlier stage companies, less governance, less experienced management.

And now what we see happening across the region actually is the emergence of true buyout markets, where, as we call it at EQT, we have this active ownership strategy where we're buying great businesses, but we're trying to make them better through better governance, meaning putting in better management teams, better strategy, more hands-on involvement and value creation.

And ultimately, the way the returns are generated, yes, you want to be invested in the right sector trends, in the right long-term tailwinds. You want to buy at the right price. But in addition to that, you want to be able to create value in the company after you buy it through the better governance. That traditional collapse of the agency problem you see in public markets between governance and ownership, which private equity has been great at collapsing that and bringing that sense of ownership to the asset, we're seeing that happening now in Asia.

And that, I think, reduces the risk, reduces the volatility of outcomes, just increases the predictability, just increases the amount of the return that's ultimately under your control through what you're doing with the business after you buy it, in addition to buying into these great businesses.

I think the other thing that's interesting about Asia is that a lot of the things happening in Asia are less correlated to what's happening in the United States. So you take something like the growth of the consumer class in India, for example-- 1.4 billion people, a burgeoning middle class. What do they want now that they have disposable income? They want health care services, for example. So you see health care services being one of the big themes in our strategy.

We're seeing tremendous demand there from people that have savings and want to invest in better health care outcomes for their children, for their parents. And that is not really that correlated at all, actually, to what's happening in the US or with interest rates or other trends. And I think that combination of uncorrelated drivers of growth, plus better governance through the emergence of controlled buyout strategies, is what's causing the asset class to grow and I think deliver better outcomes.

Well, what's interesting about the example in India, I think it's one that maybe a decade ago, we saw happen in China with the China consumer. And that was interesting from the early stages of some of the drawdown strategies over time that we've done on the private equity side. So an interesting comparison there.

You also alluded to earlier in your comments around the Mag Seven exposure, and clients invested, and where they're invested in public equities today.

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A slide appears. Text: A.I. is expected to drive the most significant infrastructure build-out in history. Infrastructure is the Critical Enabler of this New Industrial Era. Total A.I.-focused data center and energy capex expected by 2030, with footnote 2. c. $5 trillion. A bar chart titled U.S. Hyperscaler Annual Capex (in billions of dolalrs). Five company logos are shown, text: Oracle, Meta, Google, Amazon, Microsoft. The bar chart shows a gradual increase in capex per year an, going into projected numbers. In 2020 A, it is $95 billion; in 2021 A, $130 billion; in 2022 A, $185 billion; in 2023 A, $157 billion; in 2024 A, $256 billion; in 2025 A, $445 billion; in 2026 E, $719 billion; in 2027 E, $812 billion; in 2028 E, $890 billion; in 2029 E, $947 billion; and in 2030 E, $1,007 billion. Footnote 1, text: Source: McKinsey. The cost of compute: A $7 trillion race to scale data centers, April 2025. Footnote 2, text: Source: Hyperscaler company filings and Goldman Sachs Research, as of February 2026. To the right of the bar chart is a picture of the inside of a data center.

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If we move forward to idea two, I'd love for you to spend time on AI. I don't how long we were going to get through the webcast today without bringing up AI. But if we think about where the puck is going, we know that this is transformative.

Outside of the Mag Seven and the hyperscalers, or even some of the semi names, when I think about AI today, there are a number of places where people could pursue investing in the space, but doing it in a diversified way, maybe doing it in a hardware layer, on a software layer, on application layer, et cetera. What are you seeing, and how global is the opportunity for AI?

Yeah, it's a historical opportunity. We all know that. What's interesting about AI infrastructure, which I think is probably one of the most compelling opportunities in the world today in terms of investors' dollars, is the fact that AI infrastructure, it's the picks and shovels approach. It's basically getting exposure to what's happening, but really diversifying your risk across many of the Mag Seven names or other players that are driving the demand for compute.

And with AI infrastructure spend, it's not just about the infrastructure. That is more of an infrastructure business. I mean, first of all, there is a lot of excess return available today in building data centers, for example, or in supplying power to the grid, or in creating the battery systems that are going to support the backup power systems that you need, or all the components that go into the energy and the power grid and the digital backbone that's required for building it. So all that infrastructure layer is being invested in, and there's huge capital requirements for that. And there's very attractive return opportunities in those asset classes, or in those sectors.

In addition to that, though-- and we see this playing out in Asia, particularly-- there's a kind of a CapEx supercycle happening right now that feeds into the knock-on effects of all that. When you're building a data center, you need to put in the power systems. You need to put in the cooling systems. You need to put the electrical control systems. You need service operators that service and support these. There's a lot of technology that goes into this.

So that whole supply chain is very active within Asia in markets like Korea, in markets like Japan. And it's more of an industrial-- it's more of a private equity opportunity that's related to the infrastructure opportunity. So we're seeing the AI infrastructure macro supercycle, if you want to call it that, driving demand across infra as well as private equity through the whole supply chain effect that's happening. And that's something that has tremendous scale and tremendous legs on.

We think the numbers are in the order of magnitude of $1 trillion of incremental CapEx spend within the Asia supply chain alone over the next five years, a trillion a year, going from something like 11 trillion to 16 trillion, 15% a year growth, that is feeding into a lot of the really interesting companies that we see that are developing solutions and providing-- feeding into this demand growth that's happening as a result of the AI infrastructure build-out.

And do you say private equity strategy, like in that there's value creation, and you alluding earlier good to great. These companies are earning, they're growing, et cetera. But there's this value creation play that you bring to it that helps them scale. Is that what you're describing?

Yeah, I think it's about scaling the businesses. It's also about making them more global. So how do you plug them into the global demand pools? It's also about driving the technology evolution of these businesses.

There's a lot more solutions now that are incorporating AI, for example, into delivering better solutions on how do you use your power grid more in a smarter way, that's a software solution, that helps operators take the existing infrastructure they have, which is constrained now because it takes a while to build it out? How do you use what you have more smartly by bringing in software solutions that help you manage in a better way? We're seeing companies like that, for example, which are not infrastructure companies per se, but really related to the infrastructure build-out.

Well, it's a great lead-in to idea three.

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A slide appears. Text: We believe returns are going to need to come from earnings growth and alpha. Four Alphas. The first alpha is Higher Growth/Tailwinds, with an icon of a rising bar chart. The next alpha is Underfunded Asset Class/Growing TAM, with a picture of a pie chart. The next alpha is More Under Managed Assets, with an icon of two cogwheels. The last alpha is Uncorrelated Liquidity, with a picture of a dollar sign in a circle and two looping arrows surrounding it. Pointing from Four Alphas is text: Asia can deliver opportunities for investments with potential to offer excess returns.

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And really, you've already done a little bit of this throughout the conversation so far. But I think there's this idea oftentimes that private markets are less transparent than public markets. And I guess, in a lot of ways that is, in fact, true.

You get quarterly reports instead of sort of-- you can type in the ticker. But talk to us. Bring us into truly the work that goes into a portfolio and how returns are made. I think one of your comments earlier around the buyout opportunity being material now in Asia and unlocking some of these value creation strategies is helpful. But maybe set the stage on how value creation takes place. What are some of the levers you can pull? And then even more interestingly, are there some things that you all are doing in Asia that look different than the US as far as value creation in companies?

Yeah. Well, we have here, we talk about these four alpha generators that drive these excess returns. And one of them is just simply there's a lot higher growth rates in the region driven by the stage of GDP growth that we see across markets, like India, for example, which is really one of the highest growth markets globally today.

But in addition to that, is this point about the asset class being more underfunded or being less well-funded. And we can talk about that in more detail. We have, I think, some more data on that. But what you'll see is that there is a pretty big addressable opportunity in the region in terms of the size of the economic pie. But the amount of capital that's allocated to Asia still is really, really small. It's very early stages of penetration. So that supply/demand imbalance creates opportunity.

The other aspect here is the fact that the number of businesses that we see, we come across that are still not being managed to full potential, it's just a much more inefficient market than the more developed markets. And part of this, to your question, is that it's something we see in Asia, which we don't see as much in the West-- we used to see it more in Western markets-- is this idea of public companies that are very, very diversified, like the conglomerate, the old conglomerate structure, which we had in the US in the '70s and '80s-- much less common today.

You still have conglomerates in Japan, for example, and in Korea. These are very normal business structures which are now coming under question and under scrutiny because they lack focus. The capital allocation strategy across them is unfocused, and it's too thinly spread. And so you're seeing more divestitures by conglomerates that want to streamline.

You're also seeing a complete wave of shareholder reforms coming into the market there. And we can talk about that more later. But Japan buyouts, I think, is one of the key examples of a strategy that's worked really well in the US, say, 20 or 30 years ago now, starting to really take root in Japan.

And then lastly, the uncorrelated liquidity. If you look at-- last year is a good example. We talked about the stock market outperformance in Asia at the beginning. If you look at where the pockets of liquidity exists in the world, it varies.

There are times when the US IPO markets are open. There are times when the US IPO markets are not open. And there are times when the Asian IPO markets are open, and there are times when those are not open. And sometimes they're correlated. Other times they're not. And same with strategic interest or sponsor-level interest or corporate interest. It really will vary. And I think having that kind of exposure to different geographies and different types of underlying drivers of growth and liquidity ultimately can result in a smoother blend of distribution profile for investors than just being concentrated in a single geography or in a single type of strategy.

Sure. The case for diversification. I think that is a nice segue in my mind-- and you started with this. But the supply and demand imbalance is something that I didn't have an appreciation for really until prior to our conversation spending time.

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A slide appears. Text: There is a fundamental supply-demand imbalance between the market opportunity and the level of capital in Asia. Investors remain under-allocated with only 3 percent of total P.E. allocations. Footnotes 1, 2. A pie chart labeled Global Private Capital Funds Closed. 3% of the pie chart is Asia-Pacific focused Funds. 97% is the rest of the world. Text: Majority of G.D.P Growth is in Asia and the P.E. Market is expanding, with footnote 2. A bar chart shows GDP growth in 2024 in two bars and expected growth in 2030 E. The first bar is labeled Share of Global GDP Growth, with footnote 3, for 2024. 60% is APAC, with footnote 5. 40% is the rest of the world. The second and third bars are labeled Large opportunity set with growing buyout markets in India, Japan and A.N.Z. (in billions of dollars), with footnote 4. For 2024 the GDP growth for A.N.Z., Japan, and India is $60 billion, with A.N.Z. having the largest share, followed by Japan. This is expected to grow 2.5 times by 2030 to $151 billion, with India having the largest share, followed by A.N.Z and Japan. At the bottom are the footnotes. Text: 1) Global private capital closed funds, by final size and year of final dose; includes closed-ended and commingled funds only, excludes real estate and RMB-denominated funds; data includes funds with final dose and represents the year in which they held their final close. 2) Source: Private Equity International (P.E.I), Q1 2026 Fundraising Report. 3) Source: DD News "Asia to contribute 60% of global growth in 2024: IMF official" (May 2024). 4) Source: Bain analysis provided to EOT, Dealogic, Ord Minnett, Goldman Sachs; 2023 figure shown for A.N.Z due to data availability. 5) China contributes to 26% of GDP growth in 2024. Source: Finance Asia Focusing on the 2025 IMF and World Bank Spring Meetings, "According to IMF data, in 2024, China's contribution to global GOP growth was estimated at 26%, ranking first" (April 2025).

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So if we press forward to idea four, this fundamental supply and demand imbalance that you see as one, in market opportunity, but also, just structurally is taking place on the market. Will you describe that for everyone really in the simplest of terms?

Yeah, in the simplest of terms, you can see that if you think about GDP in Asia, GDP in Asia represents something like 60% of global GDP and 60% of global GDP growth. If you look at industrial value add, for example, about half the world's value add is done in Asia in terms of the manufacturing cycle, the manufacturing system of the business infrastructure.

Then you contrast those 50%, 60% numbers against the amount of private equity or private capital that's allocated to the region, only about 3% of global private equity capital is being invested in Asia. The other 97% goes to essentially the US and Europe. And so that mismatch is something that over time has to rebalance-- we believe will rebalance.

And you're starting to see that. There's an increasing amount of penetration in various markets. But for the moment, you have a handful of players that are managing most of the capital in Asia, going after pretty large pool of opportunities, a wide range of opportunities, which means that you can cast a very wide net, and you can really focus on those opportunities that you can underwrite at the highest risk-adjusted returns where there's the most value creation opportunity.

So I do think that the opportunity to underwrite to attractive returns as a base case investor in Asia probably is easier than it is in a hypercompetitive market like the US, where in any good deal you might have 30 or 40 private equity firms circling around a company. In Asia, that number might be three or four.

In fact, if you look at the total industry as a whole-- I mean, if you pull back for a minute, the total private equity industry is consolidating. So you're starting to see there are 15,000 private equity firms in the world. I think only 5,000 have actually raised capital in the last five years. Of that 5,000, I think the top 10 have raised something like 50% of the capital last year. So it's a concentrated pool.

If you look at Asia, it's even more concentrated. There's only something like five or six firms in Asia that manage fund sizes of, say, north of 10 billion. Whereas, in the US that number is more like 50. And so--

Well-- and sorry to interrupt you. Why is that? Is it the barriers to entry? Is the regulation on the market, is it just harder to do? What are the reasons why there are still the, call it, four or five players. It's been this way for decades.

Yeah. I mean, don't get me wrong. There are still-- there are lots of small and mid-size firms in Asia that are doing a great job and that are very entrepreneurial and are good at what they do, tend to be specific country managers, country funds that focus in a--

Much more regional and local.

--regional or local or country focused. I think to operate across-- which means that if you're an investor, you have to choose the market, and you've got to select the strategy. Some investors are comfortable doing that. Other investors are really looking for someone to provide that solution for them.

Then you get to the regional funds. And the regional funds need to operate at scale across the whole region. That's quite difficult to do. It took our firm really three decades to get to where we are today-- building local teams in Japan, in India, in Australia, in China. I mean, those markets couldn't be more different than each other.

If you think about what's required to be successful locally in Japan versus India, those are very different cultures, very different jurisdictions, legal business networks, business models that work in one market versus the other. There are some common sector themes that you can draw across. But you need to build the scale and the team and the capabilities, and that takes time. And so I think there's a higher entry barrier to operate across these geographies than you'd have in a more homogeneous market like in the US.

And then I think now with the way the world is heading in terms of the consolidation of the industry, LPs-- many of the institutional LPs-- are also looking to reduce the number of relationships they have to make those relationships larger and more strategic and less diverse, less fragmented, so they can concentrate those relationships and make them more strategic than they would if they had too many managers.

Sure. And in a world where relationships matter, the level of operational improvement that you can bring, the level of network you can bring, all to your earlier points around value creation, I can imagine, are incredibly accretive to whether or not you actually can provide alpha in a portfolio. So I think that's helpful.

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A slide appears. Text: Japan P.E. activity remains low, but undermanaged assets are driving a surge in shareholder activism and unlocking the buyout market. There are two bar charts. The first is titled Private Equity Activity as a percent of GDP, with footnote 1, showing the E.U., the U.S., Korea, and Japan. The E.U. has the highest percent at 1.9%, followed by the U.S. at 1.3%, Korea at 0.7%, and Japan at 0.4%. The second bar chart is titled Activist Campaigns in Japan, with footnote 2. The key has Number of Activist Campaigns in Japan in blue and Aggregate Market Cap of Companies Targeted in teal. There is an upward trend in number of activist campaigns and the aggregate market cap. In 2021, the number of activist campaigns is 79 and the aggregate market cap of companies targeted $144 billion, followed by 75 in 2022 and $90 billion, 77 in 2023 and $197 billion, 106 in 2024 and $335 billion, and 122 in 2025 with $434 billion. At the bottom are the footnotes. Text: 1) 2019 to 2023 Average. Source: Bain and Company, Dealogic, Economist Intelligence Unit. 2) Source: Bloomberg, as of May 18, 2026.

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Final idea, and I think this is one that's interesting. This is something that I think historically, when we talked about rest of world, or emerging markets, or really just investing outside of the US, I don't know that Japan was top of mind for a lot of investors. Talk about what dynamics have changed, call it on a 1, 3, 5-year basis, and why it's sort of top of mind. And then also why it's sort of always been interesting to you.

Yeah. Well, Japan is one of the largest economies in the world, but the level of private equity penetration is amongst the lowest in the world. So it's a large economy, low penetration of M&A activity and private equity activity. A lot of that's been driven by cultural and regulatory barriers to transacting or investing the way that we would in other markets. That's really starting to change.

And it started really five years ago, I would say, with a mindset shift, almost like a changing of the guard at the Tokyo Stock Exchange, where the new leadership came in and said, we need to improve corporate governance. We need to improve shareholder reforms. We need to essentially create an environment where shareholder returns really move to the top of the agenda of what public boards should be focused on. And that had not been the case over the last, say, 30 years.

And the net result of that shareholder equity returns were very, very low. They were close to zero, actually, over three decades, and something had to be done about that. So the local authorities took it upon themselves to implement shareholder reforms, which have resulted in a level of a shareholder activist activity, which we've never seen these levels before in Japan.

You can see the numbers here. The total amount of shareholder activist campaigns is now over 100 a year. In the past, these numbers would be close to zero, previously, 10 years ago. And the number of-- the size of the companies and the total market cap of what's being targeted here is now over $400 billion. Again, that's up from, say, 100 billion five years ago. And previously, again, would have been in the single digits.

So we've seen a huge level of increase in activism. That activism has resulted in more companies essentially being acquired by private equity firms as a result of the catalyst of the activism coming in to create change in the business and the governance of the business. And that has led to some fantastic investments by many participants in the industry who are active in Japan finding value in businesses that historically either were part of a conglomerate or were family run, and were really not being run to really maximize the operational efficiency of the business.

So I think this is one of the most interesting ideas we have globally right now is active ownership of Japanese companies, where you can come in and take a controlling stake and drive change in the business and drive a growth and improvement in the operations of the business.

What's interesting about the way we structure this is that we have, as I mentioned, about 2/3 of our businesses outside the US. So pretty much when you talk about the evergreen structures, all of the evergreen structures are going to provide you exposure to everything that we do, including access to Japan.

So this is a good way-- if you don't want to get exposure just to the Japanese private equity asset class, it can form a part of an overall diversified portfolio through an evergreen structure that would have exposure to this as part of its asset allocation strategy.

Well, I was going to end today with asking you favorite specific opportunity or country across Pan-Asia to put the next dollar, but I think you made the case for Japan already. John, I want to thank you for your time today.

For those of you who spent time with us, I think a couple of things stood out to me. One, the case for diversification. There is room in the portfolio to think about geography as a form of diversification, vintage year diversification, as well as structure. Whether you're thinking about traditional private equity, or whether you're thinking about the evergreen structure, there's so many ways to play. And in a world where you see greater concentration in public equity markets, but also companies staying private longer, exploring private markets in this part of the market can make a lot of sense.

I also will be spending a lot more time looking around the map. This is super interesting, and I learned a lot. So thank you for your time.

Thank you, Jasmine. Really enjoyed our conversation.

Thank you for joining us.

Thank you.

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Text: J.P. Morgan. Important Information. An investment in alternative investment strategies involves substantial risks, and potential investors should clearly understand the risks involved. Investing in alternative investment strategies is speculative, not suitable for all clients, and intended for experienced and sophisticated investors who are willing to bear the high economic risks of the investment, which can include: loss of all or a substantial portion of the investment due to leveraging, short-selling or other speculative investment practices; lack of liquidity in that there may be no secondary market for the fund and none expected to develop; volatility of returns; restrictions on transferring interests in the fund; absence of information regarding valuations and pricing; delays in tax reporting; less regulation and higher fees than mutual funds; and advisor risk. This communication is provided for information purposes only and therefore does not constitute an offer or a solicitation of an offer of shares or investment services. Certain investment opportunities may not be available in all jurisdictions, may not be suitable for all investors and may require the signature of certain additional documentation before they may be offered. Certain opinions, estimates, investment strategies and views expressed in this document constitute our judgment based on current market conditions and are subject to change without notice. This material should not be regarded as research or as a J.P. Morgan research report. Investors may get back less than they invested. Past performance is not a reliable indicator of future results. Please read all Important Information. To the extent that this material relates to investment activities, it is directed solely at persons to whom it may be lawfully directed, as provided for under section 238 of the FSMA, the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Promotion of Collective Investment Schemes) (Exemption) Order 2001, as amended from time to time, and Chapter 4 of the Financial Conduct Authority's Conduct of Business Sourcebook. Any investment services and products will only be available to, or engaged in with, such persons, and no other person should rely or act upon information contained in this communication. Some of the products and/or services mentioned may not be available in all jurisdictions.

Investing in alternative assets involves higher risks than traditional investments and is suitable only for sophisticated investors. Alternative investments involve greater risks than traditional investments and should not be deemed a complete investment program. They are generally not tax efficient and an investor should consult with his/her tax advisor prior to investing. Alternative investments have higher fees than traditional investments and they may also be highly leveraged and engage in speculative investment techniques, which can magnify the potential for investment loss or gain. The value of the investment may fall as well as rise and investors may get back less than they invested. Real estate, hedge funds, and other private investments may not be suitable for all individual investors, may present significant risks, and may be sold or redeemed at more or less than the original amount invested. Private investments are offered only by offering memoranda, which more fully describe the possible risks. There are no assurances that the stated investment objectives of any investment product will be met. Hedge funds (or funds of hedge funds): often engage in leveraging and other speculative investment practices that may increase the risk of investment loss; can be highly illiquid; are not required to provide periodic pricing or valuation information to investors; may involve complex tax structures and delays in distributing important tax information; are not subject to the same regulatory requirements as mutual funds; and often charge high fees. Further, any number of conflicts of interest may exist in the context of the management and/or operation of any hedge fund. Alternative investments are not available to the general public and may be promoted in Hong Kong to Professional Investors and in Singapore to Accredited Investors only. With respect to countries in Latin America, the distribution of this material may be restricted in certain jurisdictions. Receipt of this material does not constitute an offer or solicitation to any person in any jurisdiction in which such offer or solicitation is not authorized or to any person to whom it would be unlawful to make such offer or solicitation. To the extent this content makes reference to a fund, the Fund may not be publicly offered in any Latin American country, without previous registration of such fund's securities in compliance with the laws of the corresponding jurisdiction. Presentation produced by the Alternative Investments Team. Please read important disclosures at the end.

Key Risks of Investing in Alternatives. Additional risks. There may be additional risks inherent in the underlying investments within funds. Currency risks and non-United States investments. Investments may be denominated in non-U.S. currencies. Accordingly, changes in currency exchange rates, costs of conversion and exchange control regulations may adversely affect the dollar value of investments. Dependence on manager. Performance is more dependent on manager-specific skills, rather than broad exposure to a particular market. Event risk. Given certain funds' niche specialization (e.g., in an industry or a region), market dislocations can affect some strategies more adversely than others. Financial services industry risk factors. Financial services institutions have asset and liability structures that are essentially monetary in nature and are directly affected by many factors, including domestic and international economic and political conditions, broad trends in business and finance, legislation and regulation affecting the national and international business and financial communities, monetary and fiscal policies, interest rates, inflation, currency values, market conditions, the availability and cost of short-term or long-term funding and capital, the credit capacity or perceived creditworthiness of customers and counterparties, and the volatility of trading markets. Financial services institutions operate in a highly regulated environment and are subject to extensive legal and regulatory restrictions and limitations and to supervision, examination and enforcement by regulatory authorities. Failure to comply with any of these laws, rules or regulations, some of which are subject to interpretation and may be subject to change, could result in a variety of adverse consequences, including civil penalties, fines, suspension or expulsion, and termination of deposit insurance, which may have material adverse effects.

General/Loss of capital. An investment in private equity funds involves a high degree of risk. There can be no assurance that (1) a private equity fund will be able to choose, make and realize investments in any particular company or portfolio of companies, (2) the private equity fund will be able to generate returns for its investors or that the returns will be commensurate with the risks of investing in the type of companies and transactions that constitute the fund's investment strategy or (3) an investor will receive any distributions from the private equity fund. Accordingly, an investment in a private equity fund Should only be considered by persons who can afford a loss of their entire investment due to its high degree of risk. Investors in the private equity fund could lose up to the full amount of their invested capital. The private equity fund's fees and expenses may offset the private equity fund's profits. Past performance is not indicative of future results. J.P. Morgan's role. J.P. Morgan generally acts as a placement agent to the funds. The investment managers or general partners (or the equivalent) may pay (or cause the funds to pay) J.P. Morgan an initial fee and/or an ongoing servicing fee in connection with its services. In addition, where J.P. Morgan acts as placement agent, an origination fee of up to 2% will be paid by investors in the funds (including those investing through a conduit vehicle and in the Vintage Funds) to J.P. Morgan at the closing and will be in addition to, and not in reduction of, capital commitments to the applicable fund. The origination fee is in addition to fees charged by a fund. J.P. Morgan also provides investment advice and/or administrative functions for certain private investment funds (including the Vintage funds and funds serving as conduit vehicles investing in the funds); J.P. Morgan receives a fee for providing these services in some cases (including with respect to the Vintage Funds). Lack of information. The industry is largely unregistered and loosely regulated with little or no public market coverage. Investors are reliant on the manager for the availability, quality and quantity of information. Information regarding investment strategies and performance may not be readily available to investors. Leverage. The capital structures of many portfolio companies typically include substantial leverage. In addition, investments may be consummated through the use of significant leverage. Leveraged capital structures and the use of leverage in financing investments increase the exposure of a company to adverse economic factors such as rising interest rates, downturns in the economy or deteriorations in the condition of the company or its industry and make the company more sensitive to declines in revenues and to increases in expenses.

Limited liquidity for private eguity. Investments in private eguity funds are intended for long-term investors who have the financial ability and willingness to accept the risks associated with making Speculative and primarily illiquid investments. Interests in the private eguity funds are generally not redeemable. An investor in such a fund may not freely transfer, assign or sell any interest without the prior written consent of the fund manager. An investor may not, save in particular circumstances, withdraw from a private eguity fund. Interests in private eguity funds will not be registered under the U.S. Securities Act of 1933, as amended or any other securities laws in any jurisdiction. There is no liquid market for such interests and none is expected to develop. Consequently, a commitment may be difficult to sell or realize. Limited liquidity generally. Interests are not publicly listed or traded on an exchange or automated quotation system. There is not a secondary market for interests, and as a result, invested capital is less accessible than that of traditional asset classes. Also, withdrawals and transfers are generally restricted. Potential conflicts of interest. Investors should be aware that there will be occasions when a private eguity fund's general partner and its officers and affiliates may encounter potential conflicts of interest in connection with the fund. Fund professionals may work on other matters and, therefore, conflicts may arise in the allocation of management resources. The payment of carried interest to the general partner may create an incentive for the general partner to cause the private eguity fund to make riskier or more speculative investments than it would in the absence of such incentive.

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Risks associated with infrastructure investments generally. An infrastructure investment is subject to certain risks associated with the ownership of infrastructure and infrastructure-related assets in general, including: the burdens of ownership of infrastructure assets; local, national and international economic conditions; the supply and demand for services from and access to infrastructure; the financial condition of users and suppliers of infrastructure assets; changes in interest rates and the availability of funds, which may render the purchase, sale or refinancing of infrastructure assets difficult or impracticable; changes in environmental laws and regulations, and planning laws and other governmental rules; environmental claims arising in respect of infrastructure assets acquired with undisclosed or unknown environmental problems or as to which inadequate reserves have been established; changes in the price of energy, raw materials and labor; changes in fiscal and monetary policies; negative developments in the economy that depress travel; uninsured casualties; force majeure acts, terrorist events, underinsured or uninsurable losses; sovereign and sub-sovereign risks; contract counterparty default risk. Risks of certain investments. The securities of portfolio companies and the ability of such companies to pay debts could be adversely affected by interest rate movements, changes in the general economic or political climate, or the economic factors affecting a particular industry, changes in tax law or specific developments within such companies. The securities in which a private eguity fund will invest generally will be among the most junior in the portfolio company's capital structure, and thus may be subject to the greatest risk of loss. Most of a private eguity fund's investments will not have a readily available public market, and disposition of such investments may require a lengthy time period or may result in distributions in kind to investors. A private eguity fund's manager generally has a limited ability to extend the term of the fund, therefore the fund may have to sell, distribute or otherwise dispose of investments at a disadvantageous time as a result of dissolution. Speculation. Alternative investments often employ leverage, sometimes at significant levels, to enhance potential returns. Investment techniques may include the use of derivative instruments such as futures, options and short sales, which amplify the possibilities for both profits and losses and may add volatility to the alternative investment fund's performance. Taxation considerations. An investment in a private eguity fund or hedge fund may involve complex tax considerations, which may differ for each investor. Each investor is advised to consult its own tax advisers. Changes in applicable tax laws could affect, perhaps adversely, the tax consequences of an investment.

Valuation. Because of overall size or concentration in particular markets of positions held by the alternative investment fund or other reasons, the value at which its investments can be liquidated may differ, sometimes significantly, from the interim valuations arrived at by the alternative investment fund. Private investments are subject to special risks. Individuals must meet specific suitability standards before investing. This information does not constitute an offer to sell or a solicitation of an offer to buy . AS a reminder, hedge funds (or funds of hedge funds), private eguity funds, real estate funds often engage in leveraging and other speculative investment practices that may increase the risk of investment loss. These investments can be highly illiquid, and are not required to provide periodic pricing or valuation information to investors, and may involve complex tax structures and delays in distributing important tax information. These investments are not subject to the same regulatory requirements as mutual funds; and often charge high fees. Further, any number of conflicts of interest may exist in the context of the management and/or operation of any such fund. For complete information, please refer to the applicable offering memorandum. Securities are made available through J.P. Morgan Securities LLC, Member FINRA, and S.I.P.C, and its broker-dealer affiliates. Hedge funds (or funds of hedge funds) often engage in leveraging and other speculative investment practices that may increase the risk of investment loss. These investments can be highly illiquid, and are not required to provide periodic pricing or valuation information to investors, and may involve complex tax structures and delays in distributing important tax information. These investments are not subject to the Same regulatory requirements as mutual funds; and often charge high fees. Further, any number of conflicts of interest may exist in the context of the management and/or operation of any such fund. For complete information, please refer to the applicable offering memorandum.

Liquid alternative funds are registered funds that seek to accomplish the fund's objectives through non-traditional investments and trading strategies. They differ significantly from both hedge funds and traditional mutual funds because they can be redeemed on any business day, they are said to be "liquid." Such funds do not follow the typical buy and hold strategy of a traditional mutual fund and generally hold more nontraditional investments and use more complex trading strategies than a traditional mutual fund, which may make an investment in a liquid alternative fund riskier. Non-traditional investments may include, but not limited to private eguity, derivatives, commodities, real estate, distressed debt and hedge funds. While investments in private eguity funds provide potential for attractive returns, access to opportunities not available in the public markets and diversification, they also present significant risks including illiquidity, long-term time horizons, loss of capital and significant execution and operating risks that are not typically present in public eguity markets. Private eguity funds typically have a 10 to 15 year term and will begin to monetize investments after holding them for 4 to 5 years.

Hedge funds (or funds of hedge funds) often engage in leveraging and other speculative investment practices that may increase the risk of investment loss; can be highly illiquid; are not required to provide periodic pricing or valuation information to investors; may involve complex tax structures and delays in distributing important tax information; are not subject to the same regulatory requirements as mutual funds; and often charge high fees. Further, any number of conflicts of interest may exist in the context of the management and/or operation of any hedge fund. Economy, currency, tax and market conditions, including market liquidity, may increase the risks of these investments and may impact performance of the funds. The views and strategies described herein may not be suitable for all investors, and more complete information is available which discusses risks, liquidity, and other matters of interest. Hedge funds (or funds of hedge funds) often engage in leveraging and other speculative investment practices that may increase the risk of investment loss; can be highly illiquid; are not required to provide periodic pricing or valuation information to investors; may involve complex tax structures and delays in distributing important tax information; are not subject to the same regulatory requirements as mutual funds; and often charge high fees. Further, any number of conflicts of interest may exist in the context of the management and/or operation of any hedge fund Any investment associated with leverage will include additional risks such as implied volatility, exposure to rising interest rates (borrowing costs) and margin calls, which may occur if the underlying investment declines below its minimum lending values. Leverage will have the effect of magnifying losses or gains. Please note that lines of credit are extended at the discretion of J.P. Morgan, and J.P. Morgan has no commitment to extend a line of credit or make loans available under the line of credit. Margin calls may include sale of the asset serving as collateral if the collateral value declines below the amount required to secure the line of credit. In exercising its remedies, J.P. Morgan will not be required to marshal assets or act in accordance with any fiduciary duty it otherwise might have.

KEY RISKS. This material is for information purposes only and may inform you of certain products and services offered by private banking businesses, part of JP Morgan Chase & Co. ("J.P.M"). Products and services described, as well as associated fees, charges and interest rates, are subject to change in accordance with the applicable account agreements and may differ among geographic locations. Not all products and services are offered at all locations. If you are a person with a disability and need additional support accessing this material, please contact your J.P. Morgan team or email us at accessibility dot support at JP Morgan.com for assistance. Please read all important Information. GENERAL RISKS & CONSIDERATIONS. Any views, strategies or products discussed in this material may not be appropriate for all individuals and are subject to risks. Investors may get back less than they invested, and past performance is not a reliable indicator of future results. Asset allocation/diversification does not guarantee a profit or protect against loss. Nothing in this material should be relied upon in isolation for the purpose of making an investment decision. You are urged to consider carefully whether the services, products, asset classes (e.g. equities, fixed income, alternative investments, commodities, etc.) or strategies discussed are suitable to your needs. You must also consider the objectives, risks, charges, and expenses associated with an investment service, product or strategy prior to making an investment decision. For this and more complete information, including discussion of your goals/situation, contact your J.P. Morgan team.

NON-RELIANCE. Certain information contained in this material is believed to be reliable; however, JPM does not represent or warrant its accuracy, reliability or completeness, or accept any liability for any loss or damage (whether direct or indirect) arising out of the use of all or any part of this material. No representation or warranty should be made with regard to any computations, graphs, tables, diagrams or commentary in this material, which are provided for illustration/ reference purposes only. The views, opinions, estimates and strategies expressed in this material constitute our judgment based on current market conditions and are subject to change without notice. JPM assumes no duty to update any information in this material in the event that such information changes. Views, opinions, estimates and strategies expressed herein may differ from those expressed by other areas of JPM, views expressed for other purposes or in other contexts, and this material should not be regarded as a research report. Any projected results and risks are based solely on hypothetical examples cited, and actual results and risks will vary depending on specific circumstances. Forward-looking statements should not be considered as guarantees or predictions of future events. Nothing in this document shall be construed as giving rise to any duty of care owed to, or advisory relationship with, you or any third party. Nothing in this document shall be regarded as an offer, solicitation, recommendation or advice (whether financial, accounting, legal, tax or other) given by J.P. Morgan and/or its officers or employees, irrespective of whether or not such communication was given at your request. J.P. Morgan and its affiliates and employees do not provide tax, legal or accounting advice. You should consult your own tax, legal and accounting advisors before engaging in any financial transactions.

YOUR INVESTMENTS AND POTENTIAL CONFLICTS OF INTEREST. Conflicts of interest will arise whenever JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. or any of its affiliates (together, "J.P. Morgan") have an actual or perceived economic or other incentive in its management of our clients' portfolios to act in a way that benefits J.P. Morgan. Conflicts will result, for example (to the extent the following activities are permitted in your account): (1) when J.P. Morgan invests in an investment product, Such as a mutual fund, structured product, separately managed account or hedge fund issued or managed by JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. or an affiliate, such as J.P. Morgan Investment Management Inc.; (2) when a J.P. Morgan entity obtains services, including trade execution and trade clearing, from an affiliate; (3) when J.P. Morgan receives payment as a result of purchasing an investment product for a client's account; or (4) when J.P. Morgan receives payment for providing services (including shareholder servicing, recordkeeping or custody) with respect to investment products purchased for a client's portfolio. Other conflicts will result because of relationships that J.P. Morgan has with other clients or when J.P. Morgan acts for its own account. Investment strategies are selected from both J.P. Morgan and third-party asset managers and are subject to a review process by our manager research teams. From this pool of strategies, our portfolio construction teams select those strategies we believe fit our asset allocation goals and forward-looking views in order to meet the portfolio's investment objective. As a general matter, we prefer J.P. Morgan managed strategies. We expect the proportion of J.P. Morgan managed strategies will be high (in fact, up to 100 percent) in strategies such as, for example, cash and high-quality fixed income, subject to applicable law and any account-specific considerations.

While our internally managed strategies generally align well with our forward-looking views, and we are familiar with the investment processes as well as the risk and compliance philosophy of the firm, it is important to note that J.P. Morgan receives more overall fees when internally managed strategies are included. We offer the option of choosing to exclude J.P. Morgan managed strategies (other than cash and liquidity products) in certain portfolios. The Six Circles Funds are U.S.-registered mutual funds managed by J.P. Morgan and sub-advised by third parties. Although considered internally managed strategies, JPMC does not retain a fee for fund management or other fund services. LEGAL ENTITY, BRAND & REGULATORY INFORMATION. In the United States, bank deposit accounts and related services, such as checking, savings and bank lending, are offered by JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. Member F.D.I.C. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. and its affiliates (collectively "JPMCB") offer investment products, which may include bank managed investment accounts and custody, as part of its trust and fiduciary services. Other investment products and services, such as brokerage and advisory accounts, are offered through J.P. Morgan Securities LLC ("JPMS""), a member of FINRA and SIPC. Insurance products are made available through Chase Insurance Agency, Inc. (CIA), a licensed insurance agency, doing business as Chase Insurance Agency Services, Inc. in Florida. JPMCB, JPMS and CIA are affiliated companies under the common control of JPM. Products not available in all states.

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