Investment Strategy

Brazil first round: heading to a runoff

In our recent Latin America 2026 Electoral Supercycle note we described the regional pendulum as shifting to the right. The five presidential contests held in Latin America between 2025 and June 2026 (Ecuador, Chile, Costa Rica, Peru and Colombia) produced center right winners on platforms centered on public security, market-oriented economics, and closer alignment with Washington, extending a run that had earlier included Argentina (2023) and El Salvador (2024). Brazil, the region's largest economy, was the cycle's last remaining contest, and its first round took place today.

What happened

Brazilians voted on Sunday for the presidency, all 513 seats in the Lower House, 54 of 81 Senate seats, and governors in all 27 states. As expected, two presidential candidates advanced to a runoff on October 25.

Right wing challenger Flávio Bolsonaro unexpectedly finished ahead of leftist incumbent President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva in the first round of Brazil's presidential election while conservative allies dominated down ballot, setting the nation up for a sharp shift to the right. Bolsonaro earned 47.2% to Lula's 44.7% with about 97% of votes counted, according to Brazil's electoral court, which said the two candidates would advance to a runoff on Oct. 25.

Polls had suggested Bolsonaro, the eldest son of former President Jair Bolsonaro and a senator for the right leaning Liberal Party (PL), would trail Lula in the first round. Instead, his overperformance headlined a night of major victories for the right, which also secured substantial gains in the Senate and key governors’ races. One statistic worth flagging as we head into the runoff: since Brazil's re-democratization in 1989, the candidate leading after the first round has gone on to win every subsequent presidential runoff (7 for 7). That pattern now cuts against the incumbent.

The down ballot results reinforce the shift. Bolsonaro's PL became the single largest party in both chambers of Congress, and together with its allies on the right and in the Centrão (a bloc of pragmatic center right parties that typically swings behind whoever controls the presidency) it now commands a working majority. State governors moved the same way: of the 20 governorships decided outright on Sunday, the right took roughly 14 and the left 3, including a comfortable first round win for the right in São Paulo, Brazil's largest state. Seven more states head to a gubernatorial runoff on October 25.

Now Bolsonaro and Lula are heading towards the final runoff in three weeks, October 25. Lula has signaled continuity across the existing fiscal framework, the implementation of the recent tax reform, the current mix of social policy, and the incumbent economic team, with state-owned enterprises retained as strategic instruments and public credit through BNDES (Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social) and Caixa Econômica Federal used as a development tool. Flávio Bolsonaro has signaled a different direction. On the fiscal framework, his stated aim is to downsize the federal government and tighten spending, with the rules themselves reformed rather than worked around — the end being a smaller state and lower expenditure rather than higher revenue. On tax, the emphasis is on reducing the overall burden, which implies revisiting the reform's calibration rather than reversing it. On the state's footprint, the approach is case-by-case divestment paired with stronger governance rules, rather than broad privatization; public credit instruments would remain relevant but be confined to targeted areas. On labor, he favors "negotiated over legislated" terms, lower labor costs and reduced union influence. Neither candidate proposes any explicit change to Central Bank autonomy.

What we are watching

1. The fiscal backdrop

The central question facing the next administration is whether it can put public finances on a more sustainable path. Gross public debt has been rising since 2013 and sits at roughly 83% of GDP, up from around 74% at end 2022. The primary balance remains in deficit, (-0.4%) while a surplus would be needed to stabilize debt, and interest costs over the twelve months to June ran close to 9% of GDP. Growth has decelerated from above 3% to around 2%. The monetary and FX backdrop offers some offsets: real interest rates are higher than at the last election, currency volatility is materially lower, and the Central Bank is on an easing path.

Neither candidate has published projected numbers on how their campaign proposals will alleviate the primary deficit or stabilize debt. What they have offered is direction. Lula's platform keeps the current framework and raises revenue through higher tax progressivity, with public credit through BNDES and Caixa retained as development tools. Flávio Bolsonaro's works the other side: downsizing the federal government, tightening spending and reforming the fiscal rules themselves, with public credit confined to targeted areas and divestment handled case by case rather than through broad privatization.

Brazil Gross Debt Climbs to 82.9% of GDP

Gross general government debt, % of GDP, monthly, Aug 2025-Aug 2026

Source: LSEG Workspace. Data as of Aug 2026.

2. The shape of Congress

Regardless of the direction of travel at the presidential level, the arithmetic of the new Congress will decide how much of it can actually be delivered. More than 90% of the federal budget is classified as mandatory spending, which leaves little room to adjust it through ordinary legislation. Structural fiscal reform typically requires amending the constitution instead, which sets a much higher bar in Congress: 308 of 513 deputies and 49 of 81 senators, in two rounds of voting in each chamber. Ordinary laws, by contrast, need only a simple majority. The Senate also confirms Supreme Court justices and Central Bank leadership, a power it has recently used to reject Lula's own Supreme Court nominee. We will be watching how close each candidate's plausible coalition sits to those thresholds as the new Congress is seated.

Confirmed results point to a rightward shift in Brazil’s Chamber

2026 Election result: 308 confirmed, 205 yet to be called

Source: TSE Divulgação 2026; G1 (04 Oct 2026) — PL maior bancada do Senado, senadores eleitos por estado; Agência Brasil — composição do Senado; Electomaps live apuração. Note: Lula base (PT, PCdoB, PV, PSB, PSOL, Rede, PDT, MDB, PSD), Centrão (Republicanos, Podemos, PSDB, Cidadania, Avante, Solidariedade, PRD), Opposition – right (PL, União Brasil, PP, Novo).

Chamber confirmed counts are prorated to the ~308/513 and will shift as remaining states close.

Senate Shifts to the Right

2026 Election results: 54 of 81 seats contested

Source: TSE Divulgação 2026; G1 (04 Oct 2026) — PL maior bancada do Senado, senadores eleitos por estado; Agência Brasil — composição do Senado; Electomaps live apuração. Note: Lula base (PT, PCdoB, PV, PSB, PSOL, Rede, PDT, MDB, PSD), Centrão (Republicanos, Podemos, PSDB, Cidadania, Avante, Solidariedade, PRD), Opposition – right (PL, União Brasil, PP, Novo).

3. The U.S. relationship

One external variable worth watching is the U.S. and Brazil trade relationship. Since August 2025, the Trump administration has maintained a 50% tariff on most Brazilian exports, with exemptions for a short list of goods including orange juice, aircraft and parts, pulp, fertilizers, iron ore and some energy products. Sectors reported to be most affected include coffee, beef, fish, fruit and ethanol. The tariff sits within a broader reassertion of U.S. influence across the region, echoing Monroe Doctrine framing. A Bolsonaro win could open the door to a faster easing of the tariff given his closer alignment with Washington, while a Lula win would be less likely to shift that near term. On the other side of the ledger, Lula has worked to deepen ties with China (Brazil's largest trade partner, worth more than twice the value of exports to the U.S.) and with BRICS more broadly, which could remain a counterweight to U.S. pressure under a second term.

4. Markets

The composition of Congress and the credibility of the incoming economic team are likely to be important inputs for Brazilian assets alongside the runoff outcome itself. However, markets move ahead of facts, and we are already seeing odds being reflected by market pricing:

  1. On rates. Fiscal credibility shows up daily in long dated Brazilian rates, but the best-case scenario seems already priced in. With the Selic at 13.75% and on an easing path, the long end of the DI curve has eased to around 14.0% from closer to 14.5% in mid-September. Brazilian long rates usually move with U.S. Treasuries and EM peers, but that link has loosened: the U.S. 10 year is near 5.3%, up roughly 50 basis points in September, while Brazilian rates have gone the other way.
  2. On the BRL. The fact that the BRL has one of the highest real carries in emerging markets has somewhat inoculated the currency from the move in rates described above. Hence, we also believe the currency is unlikely to move much after Sunday, until we get greater clarity on the fiscal path ahead which could allow for a change on the monetary policy front. And in the best-case scenario, the BRL would weaken to a level more aligned with its fundamental value.
  3. On equities. State owned Petrobras is one of the heaviest weights in MSCI Brazil, alongside Vale, Nubank and Itaú, and is sensitive to government direction on dividends, capex mandates and management appointments. That type of state linked exposure has often reflected changes of administration most visibly in Brazilian equities, especially in the current juncture of historically low valuations and low foreign and domestic participation in domestic markets. Out of the 3 asset classes, we believe equities would be the ones reacting the most to a scenario pointing towards greater fiscal orthodoxy.

Looking into the runoff

A few political and institutional dynamics are worth tracking across the three weeks between now and October 25.

The first is economic team signals. The fiscal path outlined earlier is the key variable for almost everything else that follows, from the direction of long dated rates to the credibility of any legislative agenda in the new Congress, which makes the finance minister (Fazenda) pick the most consequential early signal of either administration. Brazilian candidates have historically avoided naming one before the runoff; in 2022 Lula did not formally announce Fernando Haddad until December. The signals to watch are therefore softer: public meetings with specific economic advisors, press interviews that narrow the shortlist, or ally statements positioning particular names. For Lula, continuity around the current economic team is the baseline; for Flávio Bolsonaro, the question is whether a market credible profile emerges or whether the pick leans more political.

The second is the political arithmetic. The eliminated first round candidates and their parties will decide whether to formally back one of the finalists, stay neutral, or allow a free vote; in recent Brazilian cycles the first endorsements have typically arrived within a week. How those endorsements fall will shape vote migration in the Northeast, the Southeast and the swing state of Minas Gerais. Televised runoff debates, typically one to three in the final two weeks, have moved intention of vote at the margin in past cycles.

The third is institutional friction. The Senate's rejection of Lula's Supreme Court nominee, Jair Bolsonaro's STF ordered house arrest, and a Federal Police probe unsealed on September 11 that reported alleged ties between Flávio Bolsonaro and a banker associated with Banco Master all point to stress across the political system. Any escalation involving the courts during the campaign would compete with the fiscal debate for attention, and these issues are likely to keep competing with fiscal priorities for political capital under the next administration. We will continue to monitor developments and follow up after October 25.

Sources: Câmara dos Deputados; Senado Federal; Central Bank of Brazil; Brazilian Ministry of Finance; USTR; J.P. Morgan Investment Bank; Brazilian press including Folha de S.Paulo, O Globo and Metrópoles; and public reporting. Figures and outcomes are subject to revision as additional information becomes available.

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The election is heading to a runoff, in which voters will determine the country’s economic and political direction.

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