Economy & Markets Mar 7, 2022

China and the Russian invasion of Ukraine

Michael Cembalest Chairman of Market and Investment Strategy for J.P. Morgan Asset & Wealth Management

DOWNLOAD PDF

China and the Russian invasion of Ukraine; full steam ahead for the Fed; the paths not taken

The bulk of this note is on China, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the surge in natural gas, oil, coal, electricity, wheat, copper, palladium and other prices which will probably drag Europe into recession, and impose a heavy growth drag on the rest of the world as well. But before getting into it, the chart below should hang in the offices of policymakers everywhere. Energy transitions are inherently slow moving, particularly when citizens of countries adopting them erect NIMBY barriers along the way (a topic we cover in this year’s forthcoming energy paper). As we have discussed often, capital spending by the world’s largest energy companies has fallen 75% from peak levels while global demand for oil, gas and coal are all at or above pre-COVID levels. Countries that reduced their supply of thermal energy at a much faster pace than they reduced their demand are paying a very stiff price for that right now. We expect some about-face movements on this in the days ahead.

Michael Cembalest
Chairman of Market and Investment Strategy
JP Morgan Asset Management

After issuing an Executive Order banning new oil and gas leases on Federal lands, Biden is now reportedly considering a trip to Saudi Arabia to ask for more crude supply (Source: Axios), his team already visited Venezuela to do the same, and the administration is engaging in “outreach” to the oil and gas industry. Wow.

China and the Russian invasion of Ukraine

In this note we examine the latest on China’s economy and markets. First, comments on China’s connection to the war in Ukraine since its financial and energy decisions may dilute the effectiveness of sanctions on Russia:

Energy. As shown below, Europe and China are large importers of energy while Russia is a large exporter. So far, Russian gas exports to Europe are down ~15% from 2021 average levels (2nd chart). But if Europe permanently reduced exposure to Russian gas, China could step in over the next decade. The Power of Siberia expansion and Sakhalin projects could eventually add ~80 bcm per year to Russia’s gas exports to China, compared to its gas exports to Europe which have averaged ~190 bcm per year since 2017
Trade. Since Russia’s invasion of Crimea in 2014, Russian-Chinese trade has risen by 50%. Russia is now Beijing's largest recipient of state sector financing, securing 107 loans and export credits worth $125 billion from Chinese state institutions
Currency. China and Russia began using their own currencies to settle bilateral trade in 2010 and opened a currency swap line in 2014, sharply reducing reliance on the US$ for bilateral trade (3^rd chart)
Payments. While China’s Cross-Border Interbank Payment System is mentioned as an alternative to SWIFT, it only processed 13,000 transactions per day in Q4 of last year compared to 41 million per day for SWIFT
UN. I’m not sure it matters, but China abstained from condemning Russia at the UN

As a reminder of how China’s geopolitical lens often differs from the West, since 2010 it has been North Korea’s almost sole trade counterparty (4^th chart). We searched through all 40,000 bilateral trade combinations in the world and there is none as high as North Korean trade reliance on China.

Before we get further into China, some comments on “shock treatment” plans advanced by the IEA to wean Europe off of Russian energy. It is VERY ambitious:

“Diversify gas suppliers”? That may drive prices up by narrowing European supply but not global demand. Also: 80% of US LNG is already going to Europe (and as discussed last week, is sold at high spot market “TTF” prices). The next major wave of US LNG liquefaction facilities is not coming online until 2025, and much of this capacity is already contracted as is usually the case since developers need such contracts to finance construction. In Europe, it will take time for completion of any new German LNG import facilities and to improve connectivity between Spain’s LNG import facilities and the rest of the continent
“Accelerate wind and solar”? European wind and solar MWh have been growing at just 1% per year since 2000; bottlenecks are often transmission and interconnection queues. Furthermore, electricity represents just 19% of European final energy consumption. In other words, Europe can decarbonize the grid more rapidly but the region would still be heavily reliant on thermal energy (oil, gas, coal) for industrial production of cement, glass, bricks, steel, ammonia, plastics; and for transportation and building heat
“More heat pumps for residential heating”? European electrification of residential heating is unchanged since 2013 at 25% of residential energy consumed. These are very slow-moving transitions; heat pump adoption is confined so far mostly to Scandinavia whose adoption rates are 9x the rest of Europe
“Maximize nuclear power”? Oh, the irony. In any case, European nuclear plants already operate at 80% capacity factors with much of the residual unavailable due to maintenance downtime (US levels are ~90%)

As shown below, Europe’s energy reliance on Russia is too high to reduce quickly. A decline in European energy costs is mostly dependent on (a) resolution of the Ukraine conflict, (b) the large 2.5x seasonal drop in gas demand in March/April and (c) an end to US/EU oil and gas buying for strategic reserve purposes.

In any case, what is going on in China? As usual, that’s a question that has to be triangulated

I often read that China has a zero COVID tolerance policy but I’m not sure what to make of this. As shown below, China’s reported COVID mortality rate is just 2% of South Korea, Singapore and Japan levels. Once you strip out people that reportedly died in Hubei province, the official COVID mortality rate in all of China outside Hubei is just 0.05% of its Asian neighbors. It’s hard for epidemiologists to cross check by looking at “all-cause” excess deaths in China, since China is the reportedly only place in the world other than Greenland and the Spanish Sahara (the area between Morocco and Mauritania) that doesn’t report this data on a regular basis¹.

Second, a lot of high frequency economic data in China is almost back to normal. In other words, whatever COVID measures China has adopted, much of its economic activity is close to pre-COVID levels including electricity and coal consumption, steel output, road travel, rail travel and home sales. Only domestic air travel and movie theatre receipts show signs of much lower mobility.

Of course, the other challenge regarding China analysis is that not that many people are allowed to go there right now. As a result, we have to rely on triangulated data to draw our conclusions.

The next three charts show our China activity monitors separated into positive, stable and negative signs. The 5.5% GDP growth target just announced by China’s National People’s Congress will likely require some additional fiscal stimulus to meet (this GDP growth target is 1% lower than targets for 2019-2021). The third chart may not change anytime soon: the Chinese gov’t reiterated its stance that “housing is for living in, not speculation”.

For equity investors: China has performed poorly in 2022 so far, in-line with the selloffs in other major regions this year in spite of stabilizing economic and profits data. The primary reason: despite the war, markets still expect substantial Fed tightening this year (and so do we). While abstract rules can diverge from Fed decisions, the last chart below from JP Morgan Economic Research shows the rising pressure on the Fed to act in 2022².

Appendix: the Russian invasion of Ukraine, military balances and paths not taken

On our webcast last week we discussed 1,000 years of Russian totalitarianism and the window during the 1990’s when Russia was geopolitically weakened that coincided with NATO’s eastward expansion. Factors driving that brief period: Russia’s sovereign debt default, oil prices collapsing to $10 per barrel and the disintegration of Russia’s foreign exchange reserves, current account surplus and currency. In the late 1990’s, Russians were already anxious for change back to the old ways, and NATO understood this risk very clearly:

“…the inclination to the authoritarian forms of government is not limited by the ruling elite only. Diverse social groups are more and more actively revealing their interest in authoritarianism”

“the notion of enlightened, liberal, civilized and tame authoritarianism in Russia where there are such strong and deep historical traditions will hardly work…if society does not resist authoritarianism, the present authoritarian forms of government will acquire a much more brutal and despotic character”

“Authoritarianism in Russia: Dangers for Democracy”, A. Galkin/NATO Office of Information and Press, 1999

Around the same time, there were warnings against NATO expansion from George Kennan and from 50 US foreign policy experts, politicians and retired military officers who signed a letter entitled “Opposition to NATO expansion”. Signatories included Bill Bradley, Gary Hart, Sam Nunn, Paul Nitze (Secretary of the Navy), Stansfield Turner (Navy Admiral, commander of Second Fleet, Supreme Allied Commander NATO Southern Europe and CIA) and Robert McNamara (Secretary of Defense), who by then had realized the mistakes the US made during the Vietnam War.

Was there a path that might have prevented the destruction of Ukraine? One might have been “Finlandization”, and the other might have been a path to NATO membership with explicit military protection along the way. Last November, the US and Ukraine signed a “Charter on Strategic Partnership” that asserted US support for Ukraine’s right to join NATO, but with no protections. Neither path was taken, and now 90 years after Stalin imposed the Holodomor terror-famine on Ukraine which killed 4 million people³, Russia is destroying Ukraine again. At this point, in addition to the bravery of its defenders, the only thing that might preserve an independent Ukraine is the “protection of divine Providence”, requested by Thomas Jefferson in the US Declaration of Independence in 1776.

"Beijing is intentionally underreporting China's COVID death rate", George Calhoun (Forbes), January, 2, 2022
“A series of hikes coming, but carefully not steadily”, M Feroli, JP Morgan Economic Research, March 3, 2022
Outside aid was rejected and Ukrainian food supplies were confiscated, leading some scholars to believe that the famine was deliberately imposed by Stalin to eliminate the Ukrainian independence movement.

listen to the podcast

FEMALE VOICE: This podcast has been prepared exclusively for institutional wholesale professional clients and qualified investors only, as defined by local laws and regulations. Please read other important information which can be found on the link at the end of the podcast episode.

[Music]

MR. MICHAEL CEMBALEST: Good morning. The bulk of this week’s note is on China, Russia’s invasion of the Ukraine, and the surge in natural gas, oil, coal, electricity, wheat, copper, palladium, and all the other prices which are going to drag Europe into recession and probably impose a heavy growth drag on the rest of the world, as well.

Before getting into all that, there’s a chart here that should hang in the office of policymakers everywhere. Energy transitions are really slow moving, particularly when citizens of the countries adopting them erect NIMBY barriers along the way. The chart shows just how quickly over the last 20 years smart phones, Ubers, broadband, internet access, social media, things like that skyrocket quickly. Wind and solar share of global primary energy consumption is still 4% and EV shares of global vehicles owned are still around 1.5 to 2%.

The point is that countries that reduce their supply of thermal energy at a much faster pace than they reduce their demand for thermal energy are paying a very stiff price for that right now. We expect some about-face movements on this in the days ahead, but as we’ve discussed often, capital spending by the 1,200 largest energy companies in the world has fallen 75% from peak levels while global demand for oil, gas, and coal is unchanged.

So, if you do not have a synchronous match between your decarbonization of demand and decarbonization of supply, you can experience what’s going on in Europe this morning which are unimaginable large increases in all sorts of energy-related prices.

Why are we writing about China this week? Well, China’s connection to the war in Ukraine is important to watch because a lot of its financial and energy decisions may dilute the effectiveness of sanctions on Russia. There’s a chart in here showing that Europe and China are the two large importers of energy in the world, while Russia, of course, is a large exporter. The US is kind of in balance.

So far, Russia’s gas exports to Europe are roughly unchanged from where they were last year, so if Europe decided to reduce exposure to Russian gas, China could step in gradually over the next decade. There are some projects in Siberia, in Sakhalin which could add almost half of what Russia currently sells and exports to Europe in terms of gas.

Russia has expanded its trade with China. Russia is now China’s largest recipient of state-sector financing. The countries began using their own currencies to settle bilateral trade. China has created, it’s still in its infancy, but they’ve created a cross-border inter-bank payment system to compete with Swift, and they also abstained from condemning Russia at the U.N., although I’m not sure how much that actually matters.

The bottom line is that it’s very important to watch China here because we think that it’s going to do a variety of things that will dilute the effectiveness of sanctions on Russia, in which case the war could be prolonged. Just as a reminder of how China’s geopolitical lens often differs from the West, over the last decade it has been North Korea’s almost sole trade counterparty. We searched through all 40,000 possible bilateral trade combinations in the world and there’s none of them as high as the North Korean trade reliance on China.

Before getting into some of the China issues, we do comment in this week’s piece on the shock treatment plan advanced by the International Energy Agency to wean Europe off of Russian energy supplies; it’s very ambitious. Ambitious is a synonym for probably not workable. Diversifying gas suppliers, well, the next major wave of US LNG export facilities isn’t coming online until 2025. A lot of that capacity is already contracted since you need to do that to finance construction.

Europe may agree to build and interconnect some new LNG import facilities; that takes a lot of time. Accelerate wind and solar; well, wind and solar megawatt hours have been growing at 1% a year in Europe since the year 2000, and electricity also represents just 20% of overall energy consumption. So, even if they decarbonize the grid more rapidly, Europe would still be heavily reliant on oil, gas, and coil for industrial production of cement, glass, brick, steel, ammonia, plastics, and for transportation and building heat.

We walk through some of the suggestions the EIA made as well. The bottom line is that Europe’s energy reliance on Russia is way too high to reduce that quickly. Any decline in energy prices is probably going to require some kind of resolution of the Ukraine conflict, and the large seasonal drop in gas demand that typically takes place in March, April, that’ll probably help the most. Then an end to the US and Europe that are now buying oil and gas for strategic reserve purposes; that will run its course, as well.

As for what’s going on in China, that’s a question that has to be triangulated. I often am told by colleagues and in research pieces that China has a zero tolerance policy for COVID. I’m not sure exactly what to make of that.

First, I don’t find the COVID data, I’m not alone here, but I don’t find the COVID data reporting China to be in any way credible. If you accept China’s officially reported data the COVID mortality rate would just be 2% of the levels reported in South Korea, Singapore, and Japan, and then if you stripped out the people that reportedly died in Hubei province, the official COVID mortality rate in China outside Hubei is 0.05% of its Asian neighbors.

I don’t find that credible, and it’s very hard for epidemiologists to cross-check by looking at something called all-cause deaths in China, because China is the only place in the world other than Greenland and the Spanish Sahara, which is the area between Morocco and Mauritania, that doesn’t report excess death information on a regular systematic basis.

Second, and probably more importantly, a lot of the high-frequency data in China is almost back to normal, so whatever COVID measures they’re adopting, a lot of its economic activity is pretty close to pre-COVID levels. So, we have a chart in here that shows electricity, coal consumption, steel output, road travel, rail travel, and home sales. The only things that are showing real COVID-related mobility reduction still are domestic air travel in China and movie theater receipts. But for the most part, whatever this COVID policy is, it’s leaving room for plenty of activity in both goods and services.

When we look at our China activity monitor, the data looks pretty good outside of residential commercial construction. Steel production, exports, industrial production, construction, corporate earnings, are all either rising or stable. The Chinese government just announced the 5.5% growth target for this year. They’ll need some additional fiscal stimulus to meet that, but so far the Chinese economy has been weathering the storm recently better than a lot of other places have.

Now, for equity investors, China has performed poorly so far, in line with the sell-offs and all the other major regions, in spite of the stable economical and profit data. The primary reason for that is despite the war the markets are still expecting substantial fed tightening this year, and unfortunately, so do we.

While these abstract rules on what the fed policy rate should be sometimes diverge from fed decisions, right now all of those rules are pointing to the need for a funds rate that’s much higher than what it is now. The markets are now pricing in six to seven hikes over the next year. I think that’s about right; maybe it’s five at the minimum, seven at the maximum. But we are going to see for the first time in a long time the federal reserve hiking rates in the middle of a war, and a spike in all sorts of commodity-related prices.

As a result, I don’t think we’ve seen the worst of the current war or stock market levels just yet. It’s going to be very difficult to time the bottom, but it does seem like there are more difficult days ahead given the deleveraging and risk offloading that’s taking place.

Thank you to those of you that dialed into the webcast last week. We had about 15,000 people participating globally. We talked about a lot of the issues we already talked about today, but we started with a discussion of 1,000 years of Russian totalitarianism and that brief window during the 1990s when they were weakened geopolitically because of the collapse in oil prices, the debt default, and the disintegration of their currency in foreign exchange reserves.

Around that time there were plenty of warnings against NATO expansion and we discussed some of them on the call last week, and at the end of this week’s note we follow up with just a little more of an exploration of some of the paths that might have been taken to prevent the current destruction of Ukraine. Nothing’s for sure, and nobody knows whether or not these things would have worked or not.

Here we are 90 years after Stalin imposed a terror famine on the Ukraine deliberately which killed several million people, and the Russians are destroying Ukraine again. So, it’s very possible that there’s nothing that could have been done to prevent what’s currently happening in the Ukraine. But at the end of this week’s note we do examine some of those paths and what they might have been.

So, I’ll be writing and speaking more frequently now as we go through all of this so that all of our clients are aware of our best and current thinking. Thank you for listening.

FEMALE VOICE: Michael Cembalest’s “Eye on the Market” offers a unique perspective on the economy, current events, markets, and investment portfolios, and is a production of JP Morgan Asset and Wealth Management.

Michael Cembalest is the Chairman of Market and Investment Strategy for JP Morgan Asset Management, and is one of our most renowned and provocative speakers. For more information, please subscribe to the “Eye on the Market” by contacting your JP Morgan representative. If you’d like to hear more, please explore episodes on iTunes or on our website.

This podcast is intended for informational purposes only and is a communication on behalf of JP Morgan Institutional Investments Incorporated. Views may not be suitable for all investors and are not intended as personal investment advice or a solicitation or recommendation. Outlooks and past performance are never guarantees of future results. This is not investment research.

Please read other important information which can be found at www.jpmorgan.com/disclaimer-eotf.

More Eye on the Market

Economy & Markets Oct 16, 2025

with video

Mad Libs: just fill in the blanks

Economy & Markets Sep 24, 2025

with video

The Blob: Capital, China, Chips, Chicago and Chilliwack

Economy & Markets Sep 2, 2025

with video

Fair Shakes

Important Information

This report uses rigorous security protocols for selected data sourced from Chase credit and debit card transactions to ensure all information is kept confidential and secure. All selected data is highly aggregated and all unique identifiable information, including names, account numbers, addresses, dates of birth, and Social Security Numbers, is removed from the data before the report’s author receives it. The data in this report is not representative of Chase’s overall credit and debit cardholder population.

The views, opinions and estimates expressed herein constitute Michael Cembalest’s judgment based on current market conditions and are subject to change without notice. Information herein may differ from those expressed by other areas of J.P. Morgan. This information in no way constitutes J.P. Morgan Research and should not be treated as such.

The views contained herein are not to be taken as advice or a recommendation to buy or sell any investment in any jurisdiction, nor is it a commitment from J.P. Morgan or any of its subsidiaries to participate in any of the transactions mentioned herein. Any forecasts, figures, opinions or investment techniques and strategies set out are for information purposes only, based on certain assumptions and current market conditions and are subject to change without prior notice. All information presented herein is considered to be accurate at the time of production. This material does not contain sufficient information to support an investment decision and it should not be relied upon by you in evaluating the merits of investing in any securities or products. In addition, users should make an independent assessment of the legal, regulatory, tax, credit and accounting implications and determine, together with their own professional advisers, if any investment mentioned herein is believed to be suitable to their personal goals. Investors should ensure that they obtain all available relevant information before making any investment. It should be noted that investment involves risks, the value of investments and the income from them may fluctuate in accordance with market conditions and taxation agreements and investors may not get back the full amount invested. Both past performance and yields are not reliable indicators of current and future results.

Non-affiliated entities mentioned are for informational purposes only and should not be construed as an endorsement or sponsorship of J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. or its affiliates.

For J.P. Morgan Asset Management Clients:

J.P. Morgan Asset Management is the brand for the asset management business of JPMorgan Chase & Co. and its affiliates worldwide.

To the extent permitted by applicable law, we may record telephone calls and monitor electronic communications to comply with our legal and regulatory obligations and internal policies. Personal data will be collected, stored and processed by J.P. Morgan Asset Management in accordance with our privacy policies at https://am.jpmorgan.com/global/privacy.

ACCESSIBILITY

For U.S. only: If you are a person with a disability and need additional support in viewing the material, please call us at 1-800-343-1113 for assistance.

This communication is issued by the following entities:

In the United States, by J.P. Morgan Investment Management Inc. or J.P. Morgan Alternative Asset Management, Inc., both regulated by the Securities and Exchange Commission; in Latin America, for intended recipients’ use only, by local J.P. Morgan entities, as the case may be.; in Canada, for institutional clients’ use only, by JPMorgan Asset Management (Canada) Inc., which is a registered Portfolio Manager and Exempt Market Dealer in all Canadian provinces and territories except the Yukon and is also registered as an Investment Fund Manager in British Columbia, Ontario, Quebec and Newfoundland and Labrador. In the United Kingdom, by JPMorgan Asset Management (UK) Limited, which is authorized and regulated by the Financial Conduct Authority; in other European jurisdictions, by JPMorgan Asset Management (Europe) S.à r.l. In Asia Pacific (“APAC”), by the following issuing entities and in the respective jurisdictions in which they are primarily regulated: JPMorgan Asset Management (Asia Pacific) Limited, or JPMorgan Funds (Asia) Limited, or JPMorgan Asset Management Real Assets (Asia) Limited, each of which is regulated by the Securities and Futures Commission of Hong Kong; JPMorgan Asset Management (Singapore) Limited (Co. Reg. No. 197601586K), which this advertisement or publication has not been reviewed by the Monetary Authority of Singapore; JPMorgan Asset Management (Taiwan) Limited; JPMorgan Asset Management (Japan) Limited, which is a member of the Investment Trusts Association, Japan, the Japan Investment Advisers Association, Type II Financial Instruments Firms Association and the Japan Securities Dealers Association and is regulated by the Financial Services Agency (registration number “Kanto Local Finance Bureau (Financial Instruments Firm) No. 330”); in Australia, to wholesale clients only as defined in section 761A and 761G of the Corporations Act 2001 (Commonwealth), by JPMorgan Asset Management (Australia) Limited (ABN 55143832080) (AFSL 376919). For all other markets in APAC, to intended recipients only.

For J.P. Morgan Private Bank Clients:

ACCESSIBILITY

J.P. Morgan is committed to making our products and services accessible to meet the financial services needs of all our clients. Please direct any accessibility issues to the Private Bank Client Service Center at 1-866-265-1727.

LEGAL ENTITY, BRAND & REGULATORY INFORMATION

In the United States, bank deposit accounts and related services, such as checking, savings and bank lending, are offered by JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. Member FDIC.

JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. and its affiliates (collectively “JPMCB”) offer investment products, which may include bank managed investment accounts and custody, as part of its trust and fiduciary services. Other investment products and services, such as brokerage and advisory accounts, are offered through J.P. Morgan Securities LLC (“JPMS”), a member of FINRA and SIPC. Annuities are made available through Chase Insurance Agency, Inc. (CIA), a licensed insurance agency, doing business as Chase Insurance Agency Services, Inc. in Florida. JPMCB, JPMS and CIA are affiliated companies under the common control of JPM. Products not available in all states.

In Germany, this material is issued by J.P. Morgan SE, with its registered office at Taunustor 1 (TaunusTurm), 60310 Frankfurt am Main, Germany, authorized by the Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht (BaFin) and jointly supervised by the BaFin, the German Central Bank (Deutsche Bundesbank) and the European Central Bank (ECB). In Luxembourg, this material is issued by J.P. Morgan SE – Luxembourg Branch, with registered office at European Bank and Business Centre, 6 route de Treves, L-2633, Senningerberg, Luxembourg, authorized by the Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht (BaFin) and jointly supervised by the BaFin, the German Central Bank (Deutsche Bundesbank) and the European Central Bank (ECB); J.P. Morgan SE – Luxembourg Branch is also supervised by the Commission de Surveillance du Secteur Financier (CSSF); registered under R.C.S Luxembourg B255938. In the United Kingdom, this material is issued by J.P. Morgan SE – London Branch, registered office at 25 Bank Street, Canary Wharf, London E14 5JP, authorized by the Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht (BaFin) and jointly supervised by the BaFin, the German Central Bank (Deutsche Bundesbank) and the European Central Bank (ECB); J.P. Morgan SE – London Branch is also supervised by the Financial Conduct Authority and Prudential Regulation Authority. In Spain, this material is distributed by J.P. Morgan SE, Sucursal en España, with registered office at Paseo de la Castellana, 31, 28046 Madrid, Spain, authorized by the Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht (BaFin) and jointly supervised by the BaFin, the German Central Bank (Deutsche Bundesbank) and the European Central Bank (ECB); J.P. Morgan SE, Sucursal en España is also supervised by the Spanish Securities Market Commission (CNMV); registered with Bank of Spain as a branch of J.P. Morgan SE under code 1567. In Italy, this material is distributed by J.P. Morgan SE – Milan Branch, with its registered office at Via Cordusio, n.3, Milan 20123, Italy, authorized by the Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht (BaFin) and jointly supervised by the BaFin, the German Central Bank (Deutsche Bundesbank) and the European Central Bank (ECB); J.P. Morgan SE – Milan Branch is also supervised by Bank of Italy and the Commissione Nazionale per le Società e la Borsa (CONSOB); registered with Bank of Italy as a branch of J.P. Morgan SE under code 8076; Milan Chamber of Commerce Registered Number: REA MI 2536325. In the Netherlands, this material is distributed by J.P. Morgan SE – Amsterdam Branch, with registered office at World Trade Centre, Tower B, Strawinskylaan 1135, 1077 XX, Amsterdam, The Netherlands, authorized by the Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht (BaFin) and jointly supervised by the BaFin, the German Central Bank (Deutsche Bundesbank) and the European Central Bank (ECB); J.P. Morgan SE – Amsterdam Branch is also supervised by De Nederlandsche Bank (DNB) and the Autoriteit Financiële Markten (AFM) in the Netherlands. Registered with the Kamer van Koophandel as a branch of J.P. Morgan SE under registration number 72610220. In Denmark, this material is distributed by J.P. Morgan SE – Copenhagen Branch, filial af J.P. Morgan SE, Tyskland, with registered office at Kalvebod Brygge 39-41, 1560 København V, Denmark, authorized by the Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht (BaFin) and jointly supervised by the BaFin, the German Central Bank (Deutsche Bundesbank) and the European Central Bank (ECB); J.P. Morgan SE – Copenhagen Branch, filial af J.P. Morgan SE, Tyskland is also supervised by Finanstilsynet (Danish FSA) and is registered with Finanstilsynet as a branch of J.P. Morgan SE under code 29010. In Sweden, this material is distributed by J.P. Morgan SE – Stockholm Bankfilial, with registered office at Hamngatan 15, Stockholm, 11147, Sweden, authorized by the Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht (BaFin) and jointly supervised by the BaFin, the German Central Bank (Deutsche Bundesbank) and the European Central Bank (ECB); J.P. Morgan SE – Stockholm Bankfilial is also supervised by Finansinspektionen (Swedish FSA); registered with Finansinspektionen as a branch of J.P. Morgan SE. In France, this material is distributed by JPMCB, Paris branch, which is regulated by the French banking authorities Autorité de Contrôle Prudentiel et de Résolution and Autorité des Marchés Financiers. In Switzerland, this material is distributed by J.P. Morgan (Suisse) SA, with registered address at rue de la Confédération, 8, 1211, Geneva, Switzerland, which is authorised and supervised by the Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority (FINMA), as a bank and a securities dealer in Switzerland. Please consult the following link to obtain information regarding J.P. Morgan’s EMEA data protection policy: https://www.jpmorgan.com/privacy.

In Hong Kong, this material is distributed by JPMCB, Hong Kong branch. JPMCB, Hong Kong branch is regulated by the Hong Kong Monetary Authority and the Securities and Futures Commission of Hong Kong. In Hong Kong, we will cease to use your personal data for our marketing purposes without charge if you so request. In Singapore, this material is distributed by JPMCB, Singapore branch. JPMCB, Singapore branch is regulated by the Monetary Authority of Singapore. Dealing and advisory services and discretionary investment management services are provided to you by JPMCB, Hong Kong/Singapore branch (as notified to you). Banking and custody services are provided to you by JPMCB Singapore Branch. The contents of this document have not been reviewed by any regulatory authority in Hong Kong, Singapore or any other jurisdictions. You are advised to exercise caution in relation to this document. If you are in any doubt about any of the contents of this document, you should obtain independent professional advice. For materials which constitute product advertisement under the Securities and Futures Act and the Financial Advisers Act, this advertisement has not been reviewed by the Monetary Authority of Singapore. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., a national banking association chartered under the laws of the United States, and as a body corporate, its shareholder’s liability is limited.

With respect to countries in Latin America, the distribution of this material may be restricted in certain jurisdictions. We may offer and/or sell to you securities or other financial instruments which may not be registered under, and are not the subject of a public offering under, the securities or other financial regulatory laws of your home country. Such securities or instruments are offered and/or sold to you on a private basis only. Any communication by us to you regarding such securities or instruments, including without limitation the delivery of a prospectus, term sheet or other offering document, is not intended by us as an offer to sell or a solicitation of an offer to buy any securities or instruments in any jurisdiction in which such an offer or a solicitation is unlawful. Furthermore, such securities or instruments may be subject to certain regulatory and/or contractual restrictions on subsequent transfer by you, and you are solely responsible for ascertaining and complying with such restrictions. To the extent this content makes reference to a fund, the Fund may not be publicly offered in any Latin American country, without previous registration of such fund´s securities in compliance with the laws of the corresponding jurisdiction. Public offering of any security, including the shares of the Fund, without previous registration at Brazilian Securities and Exchange Commission–CVM is completely prohibited. Some products or services contained in the materials might not be currently provided by the Brazilian and Mexican platforms.

References to “J.P. Morgan” are to JPM, its subsidiaries and affiliates worldwide. “J.P. Morgan Private Bank” is the brand name for the private banking business conducted by JPM. This material is intended for your personal use and should not be circulated to or used by any other person, or duplicated for non-personal use, without our permission. If you have any questions or no longer wish to receive these communications, please contact your J.P. Morgan team.

JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (JPMCBNA) (ABN 43 074 112 011/AFS Licence No: 238367) is regulated by the Australian Securities and Investment Commission and the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority. Material provided by JPMCBNA in Australia is to “wholesale clients” only. For the purposes of this paragraph the term “wholesale client” has the meaning given in section 761G of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). Please inform us if you are not a Wholesale Client now or if you cease to be a Wholesale Client at any time in the future.

JPMS is a registered foreign company (overseas) (ARBN 109293610) incorporated in Delaware, U.S.A. Under Australian financial services licensing requirements, carrying on a financial services business in Australia requires a financial service provider, such as J.P. Morgan Securities LLC (JPMS), to hold an Australian Financial Services Licence (AFSL), unless an exemption applies. JPMS is exempt from the requirement to hold an AFSL under the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (Act) in respect of financial services it provides to you, and is regulated by the SEC, FINRA and CFTC under US laws, which differ from Australian laws. Material provided by JPMS in Australia is to “wholesale clients” only. The information provided in this material is not intended to be, and must not be, distributed or passed on, directly or indirectly, to any other class of persons in Australia. For the purposes of this paragraph the term “wholesale client” has the meaning given in section 761G of the Act. Please inform us immediately if you are not a Wholesale Client now or if you cease to be a Wholesale Client at any time in the future.

This material has not been prepared specifically for Australian investors. It:

may contain references to dollar amounts which are not Australian dollars;
may contain financial information which is not prepared in accordance with Australian law or practices;
may not address risks associated with investment in foreign currency denominated investments; and
does not address Australian tax issues.

JPMorgan Securities LLC does not intermediate, mine, transmit, custody, store, sell, exchange, control, administer, or issue any type of virtual currency, which includes any type of digital unit used as a medium of exchange or a form of digitally stored value.

In the EEA and UK the information contained herein is intended for persons categorized as Professional Client under the applicable client categorization rules. Investments in crypto-currencies and instruments referencing crypto currencies may not be suitable for retail clients in the EEA and UK.

Any companies/products referenced are for informational/factual purposes only, and are not intended as recommendation, endorsement or financial promotion of those referenced companies/products by J.P. Morgan.

Choose a regional site for content and services specific to your location.

FEATURED SERVICE

FEATURED SERVICE

FEATURED SERVICE

FEATURED SERVICE

What's Trending

TRENDING INSIGHT

WHAT'S TRENDING

WHAT'S TRENDING

WHAT'S TRENDING

What's Trending

What's Trending

What's Trending

locate an office

offices near you

office near you

How can we help?

Choose a regional site for content and services specific to your location.

China and the Russian invasion of Ukraine

China and the Russian invasion of Ukraine; full steam ahead for the Fed; the paths not taken

China and the Russian invasion of Ukraine

listen to the podcast

TAGS

More Eye on the Market

Mad Libs: just fill in the blanks

The Blob: Capital, China, Chips, Chicago and Chilliwack

Fair Shakes

Important Information

You're Now Leaving J.P. Morgan

What's Trending

What's Trending

What's Trending

locate an office

offices near you

office near you

How can we help?

China and the Russian invasion of Ukraine

China and the Russian invasion of Ukraine; full steam ahead for the Fed; the paths not taken

China and the Russian invasion of Ukraine

listen to the podcast

TAGS

Share

More Eye on the Market

Mad Libs: just fill in the blanks

The Blob: Capital, China, Chips, Chicago and Chilliwack

Fair Shakes

Important Information