宏觀經濟及資本市場
新冠肺炎最新情况
新冠肺炎肆虐的嚴重性、最終結果及對投資者帶來的影響。
功能名稱
在本周的《放眼市場》,我們探討儘管美國是全球感染率最高的國家之一,但美國仍準備解除封城。我們亦深入探討:單克隆抗體和抗病毒試驗;市場與經濟之間的差距日益擴大;標普500指數成份股盈利的貧富分化;地區性股市表現(歐洲再次落敗);在破產數字不斷上升的環境下的槓桿式貸款。
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ANNOUNCER: This podcast has been prepared exclusively for institutional wholesale professional clients and qualified investors only, as defined by local laws and regulations. Please read other important information which can be found on the link at the end of the podcast episode.
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MR. MICHAEL CEMBALEST: Good morning, this is Michael Cembalest with the mid-May “Eye on the Market” podcast.
Around a month ago I wrote in one of the notes that the U.S. might start reopening in the middle of May due to declining infection rates. And that prediction turned out only to be half right because, while states representing almost half of U.S. GDP have announced reopening plans, the U.S. still has one of the highest COVID infection run rates in the world, and one that is declining only very slowly and has not declined more sharply, like we’ve seen in other regions such as in Europe. And given the ample evidence of heightened mortality risk for the elderly, we’re at a moment now where the risk of greater generational sacrifices is about to rise.
We are going to be tracking both the virus consequences of state reopening and also the consumer spending impact of state reopening, drawing in part from information we’re building out from our colleagues at Chase card services. We want to be able to really get an assessment for what reopening means because in different states it may mean different things, and rather than just adding up the GDP of the opened states, I think we need to take a pretty close look at what the responses are, and what the elasticity of different categories of spending are to a reopening.
Now that said, we are already picking up signs of a revived economy pulse at a national level, and we have charts in here looking at hotel occupancy rates, petroleum demand, rail traffic, mortgage applications, new business applications. There’s a decent number of high-frequency U.S. data tracker indicators that are already picking up.
One of the factors that is presumably going into these decisions to reopen is are there any treatments that can be used on a prophylactic basis for health care workers or for sick patients. The news continues to be pretty slow. There was a new antiviral trial result that showed some promise in reducing time to recovery from twelve to seven days but it involved the use of three different antivirals at once: interferon injections, multiple antibiotics and oxygen therapy. And so while the outcomes were okay and the viral load also declined more rapidly in the treated group than the control group, there weren’t that many differences for patients that were treated seven days or more after their symptoms came on. In other words, a highly-intensive hospital domicile, or hospital-only approach, it needs to be used with patients with mild to moderate symptoms, and those two things often don’t go together. In other words, people that are hospitalized with only mild symptoms.
We also had a discussion this week of the latest news on monoclonal antibody therapy, which is basically antibodies manufactured outside the human body that give a temporary immunity boost to sick patients or to health care workers. But again, these are clinical trials that are ongoing. Regeneron and some other companies are going to be taking a look more closely at these trials this summer, and could be available more quickly in a vaccine, but again, more costly, harder to produce at scale, and the impacts are temporary, usually just a few weeks.
Jumping over to the real economy and to corporate profits, last week we took at look at the haves and the have-nots of employment and how layoffs are very highly concentrated in leisure/retail, and how somewhere between 65 and 75 percent of those workers look like they may be receiving, at least for now, state and federal benefits that are equal to or greater than their pretax earnings.
This week we take a look at the high concentration of the earnings hit as well because that’s also very concentrated. It’s kind of remarkable but if you look at around 70 percent of the S&P market cap the projected earnings declines are not that bad: tech, internet retail and media, which is now, after everything that’s happened, around 40 percent of U.S. equity market cap is not expected to have much of a growth hit at all in the second quarter. And non-cyclicals, which is another third of the market, are only expected to have an earnings hit of around 20 percent, which is not that bad, given how much operating leverage a lot of these companies have. It’s the financials, and then obviously the cyclical companies that are expected to have their earnings completely decimated.
But part of the resilience of the equity market so far, and the recovery that we’ve seen is probably a reflection of that fact that more than two-thirds of the S&P market cap is projected to suffer a much smaller earnings hit. Whether that does happen in Q2, and I have my doubts, is another question. So we’re going to be monitoring the Q2 estimates really closely, given how optimistic they are for the non-cyclical stocks, in tech, internet retail and media. But if they can escape from Q2 with flat for tech and down 20 percent for the non-cyclicals, that would be a pretty good outcome.
A lot hinges on two things we don’t know yet, which is how—and I mentioned this earlier—how robust will consumer and manufacturing activity be in partially reopened states, and how large a virus infection spike would be needed to prompt a reimposition of the lockdown by the governors. And to me it feels like with the rally that’s taken place the markets are already pricing in good news on both of those questions. In other words a fairly rapid resumption of some degree of normal activity in partially-reopened states, and then, second, either the virus infection spike won’t be that big, or if it is, that the governors will have so much momentum behind the reopening decision that they would not reimpose any kind of lockdown conditions. It feels premature to me to make both of those judgments, and so, as I mentioned last week, we feel like the markets are kind of fully priced now for what the upside and downside opportunities are going forward.
And one of the remarkable things, to me, is that while 2021 earnings projections for the S&P have come down since the beginning of the year, they’re still around flat to what the actual EPS numbers were through the end of 2019. So that seems a bit optimistic, and we’ll have to see whether that plays out.
There are two final topics that I wanted to talk about in this week’s podcast. The first is a regional equity performance barbell. As many of you are aware, we’ve been following this for a long time, and I joined JPMorgan in 1987 and I have never seen any investment thesis work anywhere as consistently as this one, which is a regional overweight to the United States and emerging markets in equities and underweight Europe and Japan. There’s a chart in here showing that it’s more or less worked on a rolling three-year basis from 1991 until now, with a temporary period of underperformance in those two years of the southern European growth boom in 2005-2006.
But other than that I am actually running out of ways of imagining how this trend would ever change. Particularly this year, compared to the U.S., Europe has had a much more rapid decline in infection rates, and Japan’s infection rate barely registered at all. And yet Europe and Japanese equities are, once again, underperforming the U.S. and emerging markets.
There’s not a lot of things from the 2020 outlook have survived this pandemic but one of the more important discussions from the outlook this year, which came out in January, that’s still very relevant, are the structural advantages of U.S. equity markets compared to Europe and Japan, and specifically, number one, are much higher exposure to tech relative to basic materials, energy and industrials in the U.S. relative to the other regions. And secondly, and I think this one is even more important, within each sector, higher U.S. profitability measured as return on assets and return on equity for U.S. companies, compared to European and Japanese counterparts, within the same sectors.
So if the United States is generally comprised of stocks tilted more toward high-growth sectors, and within each sector they end up being more profitable than counterparts elsewhere, that’s a really strong structural advantage for U.S. equities, and you’d have to have a massive valuation discount in Europe and Japan to offset that and—you know, for a really long time that hasn’t happened.
Last topic: last July we wrote a special “Eye on the Market” on leverage loans because there’s been an absolute collapse in investor protections in terms of covenants. And we went into some detail on this, and there’s some data from Moody’s where they put together an index showing just how weak these covenants have become, and heading into the fourth quarter of last year they were the weakest on record in terms of investor protections. And I’m talking about things like leverage and interest coverage tests, most favored nation provisions, restricted payments clauses, leakage of assets out of the collateral pool, the ability to transfer assets to unrestricted subsidiaries and affiliates. These are the things that investors have been surrendering at a record pace.
So then you come into this year; you have this pandemic, and now we’re going to have a credit crunch and a spike in default rates. This is going to be a problem for the leveraged loan market. Now it already was, right, and almost mirroring exactly what the price action was in 2009 you had almost an immediate upfront 30 percent decline in leveraged loans in March, which is almost the same thing that happened in March 2009. And in March 2009 there was a pretty quick V-shaped recovery. I think it’s going to be a little harder this time, given the erosion of investor—creditor protections and the problems in terms of lockdown, particularly in the states where it’s prolonged, that it’s going to have on cashflow.
So to me, after this recovery, the leverage loan markets recovered around half of what it lost; to me it seems like a pretty decent time to think about shifting out of some of these leveraged loan exposures and taking a closer look at distress debt, given the expected surge in non-performing loans and other distressed assets as we head into the summer and fall of 2020.
So there’s more information on that in the “Eye on the Market” that’s coming out this week; take a close look. We also have a list of some topics that you might have missed over the last couple of weeks in the “Eye on the Markets”: we’ve addressed whether the U.S. fiscal stimulus is enough. We took a close look last time on the COVID impact on underfunded state pension and retiree health care obligations and what that implies for the Chapter 9 debate. We looked at this questionable premise about the BCG vaccine being a driver of COVID severity, and a discussion of some of the more ambitious vaccine time tables and serology results. So take a look.
Thanks for listening and I will talk to you again soon.
ANNOUNCER: Michael Cembalest’s, “Eye on the Market,” offers a unique perspective on the economy, current events, markets, and investment portfolios and is a production of JPMorgan Asset and Wealth Management. Michael Cembalest is the chairman of Market and Investment Strategy for JPMorgan Asset Management and is one of our most renowned and provocative speakers.
For more information please subscribe to the “Eye on the Market” by contacting your JPMorgan representative. If you’d like to hear more, please explore episodes on iTunes or on our website.
This podcast is intended for informational purposes only and is a communication on behalf of JPMorgan Institutional Investments, Incorporated. Views may not be suitable for all investors and are not intended as personal investment advice, or as solicitation or recommended. Outlooks and past performance are never guarantees of future results.
This is not investment research. Please read other important information, which can be found at www.JPMorgan.com/disclaimer-EOTM.
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在盧森堡,本文件由摩根大通銀行盧森堡有限公司(簡稱「摩根大通銀行盧森堡」)發行,其註冊辦事處位於European Bank and Business Centre, 6 route de Treves, L-2633, Senningerberg, Luxembourg,註冊編號為R.C.S Luxembourg B10.958,由摩根大通銀行盧森堡經盧森堡金融監管委員會(CSSF)授權並受其監管,並受歐洲央行及CSSF共同監督。根據1993年4月5日頒布的法律,摩根大通銀行盧森堡有限公司經授權成為一家信貸機構。在英國,本文件由摩根大通銀行盧森堡有限公司倫敦分行發行。在英國脫歐(脫歐是指英國根據《歐盟公約》第50條法案退出歐盟,或其後將會喪失英國與歐洲經濟區余下成員國之間獲得金融服務的能力)之前,摩根大通銀行盧森堡有限公司倫敦分行須受英國金融市場行為監管局及英國審慎監管局的有限監管。有關英國金融市場行為監管局及英國審慎監管局對摩根大通進行監管之詳細範圍,摩根大通可應要求提供。英國脫歐後,摩根大通銀行盧森堡有限公司倫敦分行是由英國審慎監管局授權,並須受英國金融市場行為監管局監管以及英國審慎監管局的有限監管。有關英國審慎監管局對摩根大通進行監管之詳細範圍,摩根大通可應要求提供。在西班牙,本文件由摩根大通銀行盧森堡有限公司Sucursal en Espana(馬德裡分行)分派,其註冊辦事處位於Paseo de la Castellana, 31, 28046 Madrid, Spain。摩根大通銀行盧森堡有限公司Sucursal en Espana(馬德裡分行)已於西班牙銀行行政註冊處登記註冊,註冊編號為1516,並受西班牙國家證券市場委員會(Comision Nacional de Valores,簡稱「CNMV」)監管。在德國,本文件由摩根大通銀行盧森堡有限公司法蘭克福分行分派,其註冊辦事處位於Taunustor 1 (Taunus Turm), 60310 Frankfurt, Germany,受德國金融監管委員會(CSSF)及歐洲中央銀行共同監管,在部分地區亦須受德國聯邦金融監管局(簡稱為「BaFin」)監管。在
意大利,本文件由摩根大通銀行盧森堡有限公司米蘭分行分派,其註冊辦事處位於Via Cantena Adalberto 4, Milan 20121, Italy,受意大利央行及意大利全國公司和證券交易所監管委員會(Commissione Nazionale per le Societa e la Borsa,簡稱為「CONSOB」)監管。此外,本文件亦可由下列機構分派:受到法國銀行監管機構(Autorite de Controle Prudentiel et deResolution及Autorite des Marches Financiers)監管的摩根大通銀行巴黎分行,或受到瑞士金融市場監督管理局(FINMA)監管的J.P. Morgan (Suisse) SA。
在香港,本文件由摩根大通銀行香港分行分派,摩根大通銀行香港分行受香港金融管理局及香港證監會監管。在香港,若您提出要求,我們將會在不收取您任何費用的情況下停止使用您的個人資料以作我們的營銷用途。在新加坡,本文件由摩根大通銀行新加坡分行分派。摩根大通銀行新加坡分行受新加坡金融管理局監管。交易及諮詢服務及全權委託投資管理服務由(通知您的)摩根大通銀行香港分行╱新加坡分行向您提供。銀行及託管服務由摩根大通銀行新加坡分行向您提供。本文件的內容未經香港或新加坡或任何其他法律管轄區的任何監管機構審閱。本營銷廣告未經新加坡金融管理局審閱。摩根大通銀行(JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.)是依據美國法律特許成立的國家銀行組織;作為一家法人實體,其股東責任有限。
在澳大利亞,摩根大通銀行(ABN 43 074 112 011/AFS牌照號碼:238367)須受澳大利亞證券及投資委員會以及澳大利亞審慎監管局監管。摩根大通銀行於澳大利亞提供的資料僅供「批發客戶」。就本段的目的而言,「批發客戶」的涵義須按照公司法第2001 (C)第761G條(《公司法》)賦予的定義。如您目前或日後任何時間不再為批發客戶,請立即通知摩根大通。
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本文件未特別針對澳大利亞投資者而編製。文中:
• 包含的金額可能不是以澳元為計價單位;
• 可能包含未按照澳大利亞法律或慣例編寫的金融訊息;
• 可能沒有闡釋與外幣計價投資相關的風險;以及
• 沒有處理澳大利亞的稅務問題。
關於拉美國家,本文件的分派可能會在特定法律管轄區受到限制。我們可能會向您提供和╱或銷售未按照您祖國的證券或其他金融法律登記註冊、並非公開發行的證券或其他金融工具。該等證券或工具僅在私下向您提供和╱或銷售。我們就該等證券或工具與您進行的任何溝通,包括但不限於交付發售說明書、投資條款協議或其他發行文件,在任何法律管轄區內對之發出銷售或購買任何證券或工具要約或邀約為非法的情況下,我們無意在該等法律管轄區內發出該等要約或邀約。此外,您其後對該等證券或工具的轉讓可能會受到特定監管法例和╱或契約限制,且您需全權自行負責確定和遵守該等限制。就本文件提及的任何基金而言,基金的有價證券若未依照相關法律管轄區的法律進行註冊登記,則基金不得在任何拉美國家公開發行。任何證券(包括本基金股份)在巴西證券及交易委員會CVM進行註冊登記前,均一概不得進行公開發售。本文件載列的部分產品或服務目前不一定可於巴西及墨西哥平台上提供。
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儘管我們提供中文文件,但據摩根大通理解,收件人或其指派的顧問(若適用)有足夠能力閱讀及理解英文,且中文文件的使用乃出於收件人的要求以作參考之用。
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銀行存款產品(例如支票、儲蓄及銀行貸款)及相關服務乃由摩根大通銀行(JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.)提供。 摩根大通銀行是美國聯邦存款保險公司的成員。並非借貸承諾。授信額度均須經信貸審批。
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