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Investment Strategy

Four reasons to consider private credit despite the headlines

In September, we laid out a high-conviction view on private credit. These are loans extended by an asset manager (rather than a bank) to corporate borrowers. We were especially enthusiastic about a subcategory of private credit, direct lending. J.P. Morgan Asset Management’s 2024 Long-Term Capital Market Assumptions (LTCMAs) suggested direct lending would likely deliver annual total returns in excess of 8.5% over the next decade; we continue to think performance can be higher in the coming year.1

Last year, performance was solid overall, with the Cliffwater Direct Lending Index2 clocking a total return of 12% in 2023. Yet there has been a steady drip of negative headlines about the space. Skeptics worry that investors may misjudge the balance of risk and reward in the fast-growing private credit sector.

We think those concerns are overstated. While there is risk of default, and direct lending may not be appropriate for all investors, in this piece, we discuss the four reasons why we continue to have a constructive view on direct lending.

1. Direct lending yields still stand out.

Recession fears have receded over the last six to nine months. Because investors are less concerned about a recession and an accompanying increase in loan defaults, public market credit spreads, which are the excess compensation investors receive for default risk, have fallen to historically low levels. High yield and investment grade spreads, for example, are trading at their tightest levels since 2010.

Leveraged (or syndicated) loans stand out in public corporate credit because they are still offering investors solid compensation. Leveraged loans are very similar to direct loans, with the notable difference that leveraged loans are tradeable securities and direct loans are not. We believe in exchange for less liquidity; direct lending offers investors 250 basis points of yield, per annum, above leveraged loans.

In public extended credit, loans are the one space still offering spread

Credit spread percentile and level since 2010

This shows the percentile of current corporate credit spreads since 2010 for the high yield market and leverage loan market at both the index level and credit ratings buckets.
Sources: Bloomberg Finance L.P., J.P. Morgan Private Bank. Data as of April 11, 2024.

Recent direct loan deals yield about 250bp wide of public markets

Yield %

This shows yield across extended credit markets since January of 2022, including high yield, leveraged loan and direct lending new deals.
Source: J.P. Morgan. Data as of March 2024. Note: YTM includes original issue discount.

2. Loan growth appears to be healthy, not bubble-esque

Direct lending has captured headlines as the fast-growing upstart of the leveraged finance world. Some investors worry growth is out of control, and that companies of questionable quality are taking on too much debt. We think the facts say otherwise.

The direct loan market is often cited to be $1.7 trillion in total loans outstanding. This would put it roughly on par with the more established U.S. high yield and leveraged loan markets, but that number is misleading for two reasons.

First, the $1.7 trillion estimate is global and includes loans originated outside of the United States, whereas high yield and leveraged loans are U.S. only. 

Second, the $1.7 trillion estimate includes a great deal of dry powder and other specialized strategies, such as distressed debt. Dry powder is capital that is invested with an asset manager, but is not yet lent out.

If we just focus on the United States and remove dry powder, we estimate outstanding direct loans in the United States to $475 billion, compared to total principal value of $925 billion for domestic high yield and $1.4 trillion for the USD Leveraged Loan Index (as of 2Q23).

The direct loan market is smaller than many assume.

It’s also important that, since 2010, leveraged financial debt has grown at the same pace as economy-wide nonfinancial corporate profits. This implies that the leveraged debt ecosystem has not grown too fast for the corporate sector. Instead, it has kept pace with the economy—and with companies’ ability to pay.

Within that ecosystem, direct lending has been taking market share from high yield and leveraged loans. Direct lending’s share of leveraged finance has grown to 17% as of the second quarter of 2023, from 7% in 2018.

Leveraged debt (including direct lending) has kept pace with profits

Aggregate leveraged borrowing vs nonfin domestic corporate Profits, Indexed to 100 at YE 2009

This shows growth since 2010 in aggregate leveraged financial debt outstanding (the sum of North American direct lending invested capital, total domestic high yield par value, and total domestic leveraged loan par value) and nonfinancial corporate profits.
Sources: BEA, J.P. Morgan, Preqin, J.P. Morgan Private Bank. Data as of 2Q 2023. Leveraged borrowing = Nor American private credit excluding dry powder, JPM leverage loan index par value, JPM Domestic high yield par value

3. Underwriting standards and fundamentals are solid

While lending standards have loosened a bit recently, suggesting lenders are not receiving as much compensation for a unit of risk, those standards remain still solid overall. Average net leverage for borrowers–a key financial health metric that compares net debt to earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization–has increased recently, but remains well below 2021 and early 2022 levels.

Furthermore, risky "covenant-lite” loans (which come with less protection for lenders) are not prevalent in direct lending deals. After analyzing a proprietary set of our J.P. Morgan Investment Bank data, we've found that only about 20% of direct lending deals completed during the last 12 months are covenant-lite. By contrast, about 90% of syndicated loans are covenant-lite.

Leverage on new direct lending deals has declined

Net debt to EBITDA for new direct loan deals

This shows net leverage (net debt relative to EBITDA) for new direct lending deals since January of 2021 on a monthly and three month average basis.
Source: J.P. Morgan. Data as of March 2024. EBITDA = earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization.

Covenant-lite loans are not prevalent in direct lending deals

% of new deals issued over the last 12 months

Source: J.P. Morgan Investment Bank. Data as of February 28, 2024.

Still, trends in the leveraged loan market may give us a clue about how fundamentals might be evolving for direct loan issuers. Overall, leverage loan fundamentals have fared better than we would have expected following the most aggressive Federal Reserve hiking cycle in decades.

For example, consider the median interest coverage ratio. It’s an important measurement of financial health that divides earnings by interest owed, and helps determine borrowers’ ability to pay. It’s fallen from recent highs of 2.6x in the first quarter of 2022, but stabilized in mid-2023 at levels below pre-COVID trends.3

 

 

Private loan interest coverage ratios have declined

Median interest coverage ratios by companies that issue in the leveraged loan market

This shows interest coverage ratios (EBITDA to net interest expense) for the broadly syndicated loan market, separating public companies from private companies since 1Q 2019.
Source: J.P. Morgan Investment Bank. Data as of September 30, 2023. Interest coverage = EBITDA/interest expense.

4. Defaults may rise further. We think investors may be well compensated for the risk.

Following the spike in borrowing rates over the past two years, defaults rose in public markets. However, they did so from extremely low levels. The increase only brought default rates back to their long-term median.

Direct lending losses match high yield and leveraged loans

Annual credit losses by asset class (%)

This shows annual credit losses (default rate – recovery rate) for the high yield, broadly syndicated loan, and direct lending markets since 2005.
Sources: Cliffwater, J.P. Morgan Private Bank. Data as of December 31, 2023. Credit losses = defaults adjusted for value recovered.

Investor credit losses are driven by default rates and by the recovery rate (the value of the assets in the event of default). Historically, credit losses in direct loans have tended to match losses in the high yield and leveraged loan markets.4 Realized losses in the Cliffwater Direct Lending Index measured 0.9% in 2023. This is consistent with about a 2% default rate using a 50% recovery rate.

Defaults are a fact of life in leveraged finance and it is possible defaults will increase further as debt costs rose following rate hikes by the Fed. Still, with we think investors may be well-compensated for that risk.

Bearing this in mind, we think staying attuned to a couple of important pitfalls can help improve investors’ chances of success in this space.

What to watch out for:

  • Concentration in direct lending loans originated in 2021/2022. We are especially concerned about the 2021/2022 vintage of loans, as they were underwritten with higher leverage and their terms may have been based on expectations for a lower interest rate environment.
  • Asset managers that lack robust and transparent valuation processes. Because direct loans are private, their valuations may be written down more slowly than similar publicly traded products. This may translate to higher fees for investors compared to public market loans.

A recent private credit primer from the Fed cited KBRA data that showed loan valuations in direct lending, syndicated loans and high yield in the lead-up to a default/recovery negotiation. Over the 12 months ending March 2024, only 17 borrowers in KBRA’s direct lending sample defaulted (or had implied recoveries),5 compared to 76 syndicated loan defaults and 37 defaults by high yield borrowers. The data showed direct lending valuations lagged those of syndicated loans and high yield in the lead-up to default. However, it is critical to note that direct lending and syndicated loans had similar ending valuations, both above high yield bonds.

TTM average post-default values, unweighted

(%)

This shows the valuation of direct lending, syndicated loan, and HY bonds in the 12 months leading up to defaults.
Sources: KBRA DLD, Solve. Note: Direct lending 30-day post-default levels are taken using the default date.
  • Loan concentration in certain sectors. Per KBRA, more than one-third of direct loans are issued to software or healthcare companies. We preach diversification, and it's critical here.

Investors remain skeptical of private credit, suggesting the asset class has grown too fast or looks too risky. We think those concerns are overstated.

Speak with your J.P. Morgan team to explore whether investing in private credit would support your long-term financial goals.

 

12024 J.P. Morgan Asset Management Long-Term Capital Markets Assumptions. As of Dec. 31, 2023.

2The Cliffwater Direct Lending Index (“CDLI”) seeks to measure the unlevered, gross of fees performance of U.S. middle market corporate loans, as represented by the underlying assets of Business Development Companies (“BDCs”), including both exchange-traded and unlisted BDCs, subject to certain eligibility criteria. The CDLI is asset-weighted index consisting of 14,800 loans and calculated quarterly using financial statements and other information contained in the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) filings of all eligible BDCs. Past performance is no guarantee of future results. It is not possible to invest directly in an index.

3J.P. Morgan leveraged loan data. Data as of September 30, 2023

4Source: Cliffwater. Data as of 3Q 2023.

5KBRA Direct Lending Data has curated an Index of roughly 2,400 U.S. companies, split between more than 1,700 sponsored and more than 600 non-sponsored borrowers. Uses Credit Suisse Leveraged Loan Index and ICE BofA U.S. High Yield Index.

Some investors say direct lending has grown too fast or looks too risky. We think the asset class is still appealing.

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